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Though this article, as its title suggests, concerns recent
developments in the law of successions and donations, it does not fit
the mold of typical "recent developments" pieces. For one thing, its
arrangement is different. Instead of following the usual plan of
Copyright 2004, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* James Carville Alumni Associate Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law
Center, Louisiana State University.
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
presentation, according to which the author discusses, first, legislative
developments and, then, jurisprudential developments (or vice-versa),
I have followed a "thematic" plan of presentation, one in which I
move from legislative developments to jurisprudential developments
and then back again as these developments may relate to the topic
under discussion. For another thing, its content is different. A
"recent developments" piece usually contains a more or less simple
explication, together with a more or less (usually less) in-depth
critique, of each of the pertinent developments. This article does
have that, to be sure. But it has something extra-a little lagniappe,
as we Cajuns would say. Of what this lagniappe consists varies. In
most instances, the lagniappe is an account of the historical and
juristic context of the development, that is, I review some of the
history of and explain to some degree the nature of the juridical
institution or institutions with which the development is concerned.
In other instances, the lagniappe is an exhaustive critique of one or
more aspects of the development. And in at least one instance, the
lagniappe is an extended rebuttal of criticisms that have been directed
at the development. All things considered, then, it might be more
accurate to entitle this piece Historical and Critical Essays Inspired
by Recent Developments in the Law of Successions and Donations.'
I. SUCCESSIONS
A. "Capacity'" to Inherit: Children Conceived Post Mortem
Throughout the history of the civil law tradition, which has
stretched on for over two thousand years now, it has been the rule that
in order for one to be able to inherit from some de cujus,2 one must
1. These deviations from the "recent developments" norm are the result of a
deliberate choice, not of an accident. They represent my attempt to satisfy the
desire of the board of editors for a piece that, while it provides adequate coverage
of the pertinent recent developments, is both more "readable" and more "scholarly"
than the typical "recent developments" piece. It will be up to the reader, of course,
to judge whether I have succeeded.
2. This expression-the abbreviated form of the Latin phrase is de cujus
successione agitur, which, literally translated, means "he of whose succession it is
a question"-has long been used in many civil law jurisdictions, Louisiana
included, to refer to the person whose succession has been opened and whose
patrimony has devolved upon his successors. See, e.g., (i) France: 4-2 Henri &
Laon Mazeaud et al., Le~ons De Droit Civil.: Successions - Libgralitgs no. 657, at
3 (Laurent Leveneur & Sabine Mazeaud-Leveneur revs., 5th ed. 1999); (ii) Spain:
5 Manuel Abaladejo, Curso de Derecho Civil: Derecho de Sucesiones no. 1, at 8
(1982)); (iii) Italy: 1 Giuseppe Grosso & Alberto Burdese, Le Successioni no 8, at
35-36, in 12 Trattato di Diritto Civile Italiano (Filippo Vassalli dir., 1977); (iv)
Argentina: 1 Eduardo A. Zannoni, Derecho delas Sucesiones § 39, at 100 (2d ed.
1976); (v) Brazil: Silvio de Salvo Venosa, Direito das Sucessies no. 1.4, at 21-22
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"exist" at the moment of his death.3 Furthermore, the property of
"existence" has been predicated of persons who, at that moment, have
already been born or, at the very least, have already been
"conceived,"4 provided that, in this latter case, the person should later
be born alive.
Back in 2001, the Louisiana Legislature altered these long-
standing rules. Through Act 479 of that year, the legislators enacted
a new provision of Title 9 of the Revised Statutes (the "Civil Code
Ancillaries") - § 391.1. According to that section, a child would be
(1991); and (vi) Louisiana: Succession of Hebert, 33 La. Ann. 1099, 1102 (1881);
Kimball Allyn Cross, A Treatise on Successions § 2, at 1 (1891). Despite its
ancient lineage and its technical superiority over other expressions such as
"deceased" or the common law locution "decedent," see Cross, supra, § 2, at 1-2,
the expression de cujus may, I fear, soon pass into desuetude here in Louisiana. The
revised Civil Code does not use it, but uses, instead, various technically inferior
expressions, sometimes "deceased," see, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 871 (rev. 1981),
and, at other times, "decedent," see, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 935 (rev. 1996). No
Louisiana appellate court has used the expression since 1994. See Carl v. Naquin,
637 So. 2d 736, 738 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994). And not long ago I heard of a third-
year student enrolled in a "successions" class at my own law school (the supposed
bastion of civil law instruction in Louisiana), who, when asked "What is a de
cujus?," responded, "Never heard of it." It won't be long now.
3. Clear and direct authority for this proposition can be found at least as far
back as the time of Pothier. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 939 (rev. 1997) ("A
successor must exist at the death of the decedent."); La. Civ. Code art. 947 (1825)
("In order to be able to inherit, the heir must exist at the moment that the succession
becomes open."); Digest of the Civil Laws Now in Force in the Territory of Orleans
bk. III, tit. I, art. 65 (1808) ("Nevertheless, to be able to inherit, the heir must
necessarily exist at the moment that the succession becomes open. Thus, he who
is not yet conceived.., is incapable of inheriting."); Code Civil (France) art. 725
(1804) ("In order to inherit, the heir must necessarily exist at the moment that the
succession becomes open."); Robert J. Pothier, Coutame d'Orlgans tit. XVII, no.
6 ("In order to be able to succeed from someone, it is necessary, before all else, to
exist at the time at which the succession is opened. That is why those who, at the
time of this opening, are not even yet conceived, can never claim to succeed.").
Prior to that time, the pertinent authorities, though they uniformly support this
proposition, do so rather more obliquely. See, e.g., Jean Domat, Les Lois Civiles
dans Leur Ordre Naturel liv. I, it. I, sect. II, nos. 1, 4, & 5 ("Every person can be
an heir, be it by intestacy... or by a testament .... A still-born child, even though
it was alive in its mother's womb, does not succeed when some succession that
concerns it, be this succession intestate or testamentary, has fallen .... A child
who is born alive, though it should thereafter immediately die, is capable of a
succession tlaat has fallen in the interval between its conception and its death.")
4. See, e.g., Pothier, supra note 3, at no. 6; Digest, supra note 3, at art. 65.
As it was originally used, the term no doubt referred to "fertilization and
implantation" together, for, until recently, one could not be certain that the former
had occurred until the latter, too, had occurred. But with the advent of modem
"assisted reproduction" technologies, in particular, that of in vitro fertilization, these
two once inseparable events can now be distinguished. And today, in at least some
jurisdictions (Louisiana included, it seems), conception refers to fertilization alone.
See La. Civ. Code art. 26 cmt. (b).
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considered the legitimate child of the de cujus (and, therefore,
presumably would be entitled to inherit from him) even though that
child had not been born or even conceived as of the moment of the de
cujus' death, provided that the following prerequisites were satisfied:
(1) the child was produced by the union of the gametes of the
de cujus and his wife';
(2) this union of gametes had been authorized by the de cujus
in writing; and
(3) the child was born within two (2) years of the de cujus'
death.6
The effect of this new statute, clearly enough, was to accord
capacity to inherit to yet another class of persons, what might be
called "posthumously conceived children."
During its most recent session, the Louisiana Legislature amended
the new statute. The amendments, which were enacted as part of Act
No. 495, are reflected in the following chart:
Original Version
§ 391.1. Child
conceived after
death of
husband
A. Notwith-
standing the
provisions of
Civil Code
Articles 184 and
185 to the
Original Version
with Amendments
§ 391.1. Child
conceived after
death of
husbMd-parent
A. Notwith-
standing the
provisions of
Cii o td
Aieles 184 and
+68-5--t o the
Amended Version
§ 391.1. Child
conceived after
death of parent
A. Notwith-
standing the
provisions to the
contrary of any law,
any child conceived
after the death of a
5. As the phrase "the de cujus and his wife" implies, the statute deals only
with cases in which (i) the persons whose gametes are united to produce the child
were married and (ii) it is the husband who has died and the wife who has thereafter
united their respective gametes and has then given birth to a child. The statute
makes no provision for cases in which (i) the persons whose gametes are united to
produce the child are merely "lovers" or, worse yet, strangers or (ii) it is the wife
who has died and the husband who has thereafter united their respective gametes
and (with the help of a "surrogate mother," of course) has then given birth to a
child. Under current Louisiana law, contracts for "surrogate motherhood" are
considered to be contra bonos mores; the same would probably be true (so one
would hope) of contracts to produce a child out of wedlock.
6. It's worth noting that there is no requirement that the de cujus have "given
up" his gametes while he was still alive. To the contrary, it's conceivable (pun
intended) that his gametes might have been "harvested" from his body after his
death.
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contrary and in
addition to the
provisions of
Civil Code Article
179, any child
conceived after
the death of a
decedent, who
s p e c i fi c ally
authorized in
writing his
surviving spouse
to use his
gametes, shall be
deemed the
legitimate child of
such decedent,
provided the child
was born to the
surviving spouse,
using the gametes
of the decedent,
within two years
of the death of the
decedent.
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contrary nd- in
additioni to 01%
Civil Co Arte c
+T9 any law, any
child conceived
after the death of
a decedent, who
s p e c i fi c a 1 I y
authorized in
writing his
surviving spouse
to use his
gametes, shall be
deemed the
legitimitechild of
such decedent
with all rights,
including the
capacity to inherit
from the
decedent, as the
child would have
had if the child
had been in
existence at the
time of the death
of the deceased
parent, provided
the child was born
to the surviving
spouse, using the
gametes of the
decedent, within
three two three
years of the death
of the decedent.
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decedent, who
specifically
authorized in writing
his surviving spouse
to use his gametes,
shall be deemed the
child of such
decedent with all
rights, including the
capacity to inherit
from the decedent, as
the child would have
had if the child had
been in existence at
the time of the death
of the deceased
parent, provided the
child was born to the
surviving spouse,
using the gametes of
the decedent, within
three years of the
death of the
decedent.
The amendment changes § 391.1 in four respects. First, the
amendment eliminates from the statute's "notwithstanding" clause the
reference that the clause had theretofore contained those Civil Code
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articles from which the statute derogates (179, 7 184,' and 1859),
replacing that specific reference with a more generic reference to "any
law." Second, the amendment eliminates the adjective "legitimate"
before the noun "child," so that, now, the statute no longer addresses
the question whether a child born under its auspices is legitimate or
illegitimate. Third, the amendment spells out thejuridical effects that
follow from the classification of the child as a "child of the
decedent," in particular, the child's capacity to inherit from that
decedent. Fourth, the amendment extends the deadline by which the
child must be born, if it is to be considered a "child of the decedent,"
from two years after the decedent's death to three years after the
decedent's death.
The first change-the extension of the scope of the
"notwithstanding" clause to "any law"-reflects the legislature's
recognition that § 391.1 derogates from more "law" thanjust the three
Civil Code articles that were enumerated in that clause as it was
originally written. To these articles, one can add several others, for
example, (i) Articles 2510 and 26,1 which concern the onset of
"natural personality"; (ii) Articles 939 and 940, which concern
capacity to inherit; and (iii) Articles 1472 and 1474, which concern
capacity to receive donations. In addition to these other Civil Code
articles, § 391.1 derogates from various special private law statutes,
such as the Trust Code (in particular, § 1891, which concerns "class
trusts""2 ) and perhaps even a public law statute or two, such as the
Internal Revenue Code (in particular, § 2402, which concerns "estate
tax" exemptions 13 ). The list goes on. Having recognized that the
7. La. Civ. Code art. 179 ("Legitimate children are those who are either born
or conceived during marriage or who have been legitimated as provided
hereafter.").
8. La. Civ. Code art. 184 ("The husband of the mother is presumed to be the
father of all children born or conceived during the marriage.").
9. La. Civ. Code art. 185 ("A child born less than three hundred days after the
dissolution of the marriage is presumed to have been conceived during the marriage.
A child born three hundred days or more after the dissolution of the marriage is not
presumed to be the child of the husband.").
10. La. Civ. Code art. 25 ("Natural personality commences from the moment
of live birth and terminates at death.").
11. La. Civ. Code art. 26 ("An unborn child shall be considered as a natural
person for whatever relats to its interests from the moment of conception .... ).
12. La. R.S. 9:1891 (2004) (" . . . a person may create an inter vivos or
testamentary trust in favor of a class consisting of some or all of his children,
grandchildren, [etc.] .... although some members of the class are not yet in being
at the time of the creation of the trust, provided at least one member of the class is
then in being . ").
13. La. R.S. 47:2402 (2004) ("The following shall be exempt from the tax
imposed in this Part: (1) Inheritances, legacies, and donations and gifts made in
contemplation of death, to a direct descendant by blood or affinity, or ascendant,
[Vol. 64
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original "notwithstanding" clause was woefully underinclusive, the
legislature, to its credit, decided that the clause had to be "fixed."
The "fix" it chose was simple and elegant: instead of listing each
piece of legislation from which § 391.1 derogates, simply use the
catch-all phrase "any law."
The second change-suppression of the term "legitimate"-no
doubt stems, at least to some degree, from the legislature's new-
found (some would add "politically correct") sensitivity toward
illegitimates, a sensitivity that recently led the legislature to demand
that references to legitimacy and illegitimacy be expunged from all
legislation. In this instance, at least, the elimination of such a
reference is entirely defensible. From the very beginning, the
principal, if not sole, concern of § 391.1 has undoubtedly been to
assure that a child born in accordance with it can inherit from "the
decedent." Now, when it comes to the right to inherit, the
distinction between legitimates and illegitimates is of no moment:
since 1981, the successions law of Louisiana has drawn no such
distinction, that is to say, illegitimates have inherited on an equal
footing with legitimates since that time.' 4
The purpose of the third change-the specification of the
juridical effects of the child's status as "child of the
decedent"-was, one suspects, simply to make clearer the real point
of § 391.1, namely, that a child born under it can inherit from him
whose "gametes" were used to create the child. As the statute was
originally written, it said nothing, at least not expressly, about any
of the child's "rights," not even those related to successions; to the
contrary, one was left to infer that the child had such rights from the
statute's classification of the child as the "legitimate child of the
decedent."' 5 The amendment merely makes this inference explicit.
or surviving spouse of a decedent... (e) To the total amount or value of the
inheritance, legacy, donation or gift made in contemplation of death to a surviving
spouse of a decedent if the time of death occurs during calendar year 1992 or
thereafter.").
14. See La. Civ. Code art. 888 & cmt.; see also Frederick W. Swaim, Jr. &
Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Successions and Donations, 10 La. Civ. Law Treatise §
2.09, at 32 (1995).
15. Insofar as the original statute contained no special provision regarding the
effects of the child's status as "legitimate child of the decedent," the general rule
regarding the effects of that status, one must suppose, would have been applicable,
at least to the effects specified by that rule were not inconsistent with the situation
of the posthumously conceived child. Now, one of the effects that are, as a general
rule, attached to legitimate status is the right of inheritance, in particular, the right
of the child to inherit from the person as to whom he is legitimate. Indeed, in view
of the fact that the posthumously conceived child's father is, by definition, already
dead at the time of the child's birth, this may well be the only effect of legitimate
status that is not inconsistent with the situation of such a child. For example,
2004]
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The reason for the fourth change-the extension of the "birth
deadline" from two to three years after the decedent's death-is
"political." It reflects the legislature's desire to accord an extra
measure of grace, to grant still another concession, to those widows
who might want to avail themselves of the benefits of § 391.1.
Though no one could have doubted that § 391.1 stood in need of
reform, one can certainly doubt that this is that reform. In my
judgment, what was needed was not the liberalization of that section,
but rather its complete suppression.
It is obvious that, at least in the society of which we are a part, the
two persons who cooperate in the act of procreation normally
cooperate as well in rearing the child who results from that act. What
is perhaps not so obvious, though it can nevertheless not be doubted,
is that this pattern is the norm for all cultures.16 Now, that this pattern
is normal does not, of course, mean that it is normative. To
determine whether it is the latter, one must, of course, have resort to
some sort of ethical theory.
On the topic of the "ethics" ofpost mortem conception, a good bit
has already been written,'7 much of it by persons who are better
inasmuch as the child's father is dead, the child, of course, could not possibly
demand alimentary support from the father, owe alimentary support to the father,
or serve as the father's curator.
16. See Claude Levi-Strauss, The Family, in Man, Culture and Society 261
(Harry L. Shapiro ed. 1956), reprinted in Studies in Social and Cultural
Anthropology 128, 129-30 (John Middleton ed. 1968) ("[T]he accumulation ofdata
made obvious the following fact: the kind of family features in modem civilization
by monogamous marriage, independent establishment of the young people, warm
relationship between parents and offspring, et cetera, while not always easy to
recognize behind the complicated network of strange customs and institutions of
savage peoples, is at least conspicuous among those which seem to have remained
on-or returned to-the simplest cultural level .... The observer working in the
field has no trouble identifying the married couples, closely associated by
sentimental bonds and economic co-operation as well as by the rearing of children
born from their own union .... Thus, after they had claimed for about fifty years
that the family, as modem societies know it, could only be a recent development
and the outcome of a slow and long-lasting evolution, anthropologists now lean
toward an opposite conviction, i.e., that the family, consisting of a more or less
durable union, socially approved, of a man, a woman, and their children, is a
universal phenomenon, present in each and every type of society.").
17. See, e.g., Carson Strong, Consent to Sperm Retrieval and Insemination
after Death or Persistent Vegetative State, 14 J.L. & Health 243, 258-61
(1999-2000); Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Non-Traditional
Conceptions: Social Security Survivor's Benefits for Posthumously Conceived
Children, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 251, 298-304 (1999); Andrea V. Corvalan,
Comment, Fatherhood After Death: A Legal and Ethical Analysis of Posthumous
Reproduction, 7 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 335, 362-63 (1997); Ronald Chester,
Freezing the Heir Apparent: A Dialogue on Postmortem Conception, Parental
Responsibility, and Inheritance, 33 Hous. L. Rev. 967, 994-1003 (1996); Barry
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acquainted with ethical theory than am 1.18 Though at least a few of
the authors who have addressed the problem have arrived at the same
conclusion as I have-that the practice of post mortem conception is
morally objectionable-none of them, to my knowledge, has yet set
forth an argument in support of this conclusion that fully coincides
with my own. What follows is an admittedly tentative and summary
exposition of that argument.
The argument takes as its starting point the nature of what might
be called a "good father." Such a father is one who, once he has
helped to create a child, "takes responsibility" for it, that is to say,
who contributes to its nurture, care, and upbringing-who helps
"rear" it. This rearing entails a number of elements. The first, and
perhaps most basic, element is "support": the good father, to the
extent he is able, participates with his wife-the mother of the child
-in supplying the material needs of the child, be it in kind or by way
of generating income with which the means of meeting those needs
can be purchased. The second element is "education": the good
father, to the extent he is able, participates with his wife in teaching
the child what it needs to know in realize its potential as a person,
both as an individual and as a member of the community. The
knowledge that the father helps to impart is not only academic, but
also practical, not only material, but also spiritual, not only secular,
but also religious. Not only that, but the education to which he
contributes is as much a matter of "showing" (through "doing") as it
is of "telling." By virtue of his interaction with his wife and with
other women, on the one hand, and with other men, on the other, in
the presence of the child, he provides the child with a "male" role
Brown, Advanced Reproductive Technologies Symposium: Reconciling Property
Law with Advances in Reproductive Science, 6 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 73, 80 (1995);
John A. Robertson, Symposium: Emerging Paradigms in Bioethics: Posthumous
Reproduction: Introduction, 69 Ind. L.J. 1027, 1028-35 (1994). These articles and
comments represent just the tip of the iceberg.
Among the few authors who contend that post mortem conception is morally
objectionable, most base their arguments on either (i) the supposed immorality of
the medical procedures that it entails (though sperm can be harvested surgically, it
is, in fact, almost always harvested onanistically and, in any event, the insemination
takes place outside the context of an actual physical union between the procreators)
or (ii) the supposed "best interest" of the child (a child's interests are best served
by his being reared in a two-parent family). I certainly concur in both of these
arguments. But neither argument really gets at what, in my judgment, is the
fundamental moral flaw in post mortem conception.
18. I am not, by any means, a "professional ethicist." Though I have received
advanced training in philosophy, my work was concentrated in the areas of
philosophy of religion and history of philosophy. If I had better judgment, I might,
then, refuse to dive in to this ethical debate, for fear that I might soon find myself
in over my head. The only alternative, unfortunately, is for me to remain silent when
I feel conscience-bound to speak.
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model, a model that will be of critical importance to the child in
developing his or her own gender identity as time passes. And by
virtue of his interaction with his wife in the presence of the child, he
provides the child with yet another important social model-a living
model of what a "husband" is and does within the marital
relationship, thereby helping to prepare the child for his or her own
entry into this most important of social institutions some day in the
future. The third element-that which is perhaps the most difficult to
define-is "relationship": the good father, to the extent he is able,
enters into an interpersonal relationship with his child, one
characterized my mutual "sharing" at the level of emotions and
affections. But for the fact that the relationship is asymmetrical in
terms of power (the child is subordinate to the father), it might be
described simply as "friendship." What the father gives the child
through this relationship is, one might say, the gift of his very self.
Now, this "good father" constitutes the ideal (the Greek
philosophers would have called it a telos) on which every actual
father sets his sights, save when his judgment is inflamed by passion
or corrupted by self-interest, for it represents the "good" for all fathers
(and every person, of course, naturally pursues his good). If one is
to be a father, properly so called, this, then, is the end toward which
he must ("ought" to) strive. It follows, then, that such a man is
obligated to do what this "good father" would do, that is, to rear his
child or, to be more specific, to support his child, to educate him, and
to enter into relationship with him.'9 In short, he has a "duty" to do
these things, one that he owes to his child.2°
19. I recognize that, at this point in my argument, I am, at least in some sense,
trying to derive an "ought" from an "is," something that for many philosophers,
especially those in the English empiricist-analytical tradition, is illegitimate. Like
many other neo-Aristoteleans and neo-Thomists, I do not share this point of view.
See, e.g., Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory 56-59 (2d ed.
1984).
20. The proposition that the parents-the father included-have a duty to
participate in rearing their common offspring finds support in a wide variety of
writings on Christian ethics. See, e.g., Kant, The Science ofRight § 28 (W. Hastie
trans.), in 42 Great Books of the Western World: Kant 397, 420 (Robert Maynard
Hutchins & Mortimer J. Adler eds., 1978); Emil Brunner, Justice and the Social
Order 145-146 (1945); 2 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, pt. 3, Q. 30, art.
2, at 2177-78 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trs., Benzinger Bros. ed.
1947); Code of Canon Law arts. 1113 (1917); Code of Canon Law arts. 793 & 1136(1983); Thomas P. Doyle, O.P., The Moral Inseparability of the Unitive and
Procreative Aspects ofHuman Sexual Intercourse, 3 Marriage Studies: Reflections
in Canon Law and Theology 54, 63-66 (1985); Congregation for the Doctrine of
the Faith, Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity
of Procreation: Replies to Certain Questions of the Day II, A, 1 (1987); Catechism
of the Catholic Church no. 2221, at 594, & no. 2228, at 595-96 (1995). St.
Thomas' treatment of this point is classic:
[Vol. 64
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Because the would-be father owes this duty to rear his offspring,
he acts wrongly if, at the time at which he decides to pursue
fatherhood, he has no intention of fulfilling this duty. Few would
deny, I think, that if a certain "position" or "status" entails certain
responsibilities, then anyone who would presume to occupy that
position or to attain that status must be prepared to fulfill those
responsibilities or, to put the point the point negatively, that anyone
who is not prepared to fulfill those responsibilities has "no business"
occupying that position or attaining that status.2' A person who
would act in violation of this maxim is not unlike Kant's hypothetical
Marriage or wedlock is said to be true by reason of its attaining its
perfection. Now perfection of anything is two-fold; first, and second. The
first perfection of a thing consists in its very form, from which it receives
its species; while the second perfection of a thing consists in its operation,
by which in some way a thing attains its end. Now the form of matrimony
consists in a certain inseparable union of souls, by which husband and wife
are pledged by a bond of mutual affection that cannot be sundered. And
the end of matrimony is the begetting and upbringing of children: the first
of which is attained by conjugal intercourse; the second by the other duties
of husband and wife, by which they help one another in rearing their
offspring.
St. Thomas, supra this note, at 2177-78 (emphasis added). The same point is made,
though with somewhat greater development, by Kant:
... [F]rom the fact of procreation in the union thus constituted [i.e., of
man and woman in marriage], there follows the duty of preserving and
rearing children as the products of this union. Accordingly, children, as
persons, have, at the same time, an original congenital right-
distinguished from mere hereditary right- to be reared by the care of their
parents till they are capable of maintaining themselves ....
For what is thus produced is a person .... And hence, in the practical
relation, it is quite a correct and even a necessary idea to regard the act of
generation as a process by which a person is brought without his consent
into the world and placed in it by the responsible free will of others. This
act, therefore, attaches an obligation to the parents to make their children
-as far as their power goes-contented with the condition thus acquired.
Hence parents cannot regard their child as, in a manner, a thing of their
own making; for a being endowed with freedom cannot be so regarded.
Nor, consequently, have they a right to destroy it was if it were their own
property, or even to leave it to chance; because they have brought a being
into the world who becomes in fact a citizen of the world, and they have
placed that being in a state which they cannot be left to treat with
indifference, even according to the natural conception of right.
Kant, supra this note, at 420.
21. A few examples may help to illustrate this basic maxim of "common sense"
practical reason. Imagine, first, someone who enters into a marriage but yet has no
intention of ever having sexual relations with his spouse. Wouldn't such conduct
be universally condemned as immoral and perhaps even incomprehensible? Next,
imagine someone who runs for public office-say, a seat in the legislature-but yet
has no intention of ever attending a single legislative session. Again, would not
such conduct leave us outraged, puzzled, or both?
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"lying promisor," who promises a certain performance when he
knows full well that he will not keep it.22 To take up some role to
which duties are attached without, in so doing, intending to perform
those duties is the moral equivalent of making just such a "lying
promise." In both cases, the obligor's conduct borders on fraud.
Viewed in the light of these considerations, post mortem
fatherhood shows it unethical face. When thepost mortem father-to-
be decides to participate in the act of procreation, he cannot possibly
have it in his mind that he will in fact discharge all of his duties
toward his future child. At most, he may intend to and then take steps
to discharge his duty of support, for example, by leaving the future
child a legacy or at least here in Louisiana by simply counting on the
remnant of the law of forced heirship to do its job. But to discharge
his duty of education or his duty of relationship, he must, of course,
still "be around" when and after the child enters the world, something
that, by definition, he will not do because he cannot do. Such a man
cannot and will not possibly reach the telos of the good father and,
what's worse, he knows that he can't and won't when he decides to
become a father. He is, in the words of Maggie Gallagher, the
"ultimate deadbeat dad. ' 3
22. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysic of Morals § 2, in 42 Great Books of
Western Philosophy: Kant 251, 269, 272 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952).
23. Maggie Gallagher, The Ultimate Deadbeat Dads, Newsday 28, Feb. 1,
1995 (part of New York Forum About Sperm).
According to the critics, if it is wrong for a dying father to make plans to
participate in "artificial"post mortem conception because his doing so would entail
a breach of his "duty to rear" the child that results from this procedure-, then it
must also be wrong for a dying father to participate in "natural" ante mortem
conception-because his doing so would entail a breach of his "duty to rear" the
child that results from that procedure. Put another way, the critics' point is this: if
it's wrong for a man to reproduce when, thanks to his having been diagnosed with
some terminal illness or condition, he knows he won't "be around" to help rear the
resulting child, then not only should he refrain from laying plans for post mortem
conception, but he should also stop having sex with his wife in the meantime. This
latter possibility, the critics suggest, is absurd (and not a little cruel).
What the critics fail to recognize is that the ante mortem scenario is complicated
in a way that the post mortem scenario is not: in the former, but not the latter, the
father finds himself subject to a second duty, one that he owes to his wife in his
capacity as her husband, a duty that may, in some circumstances, outweigh the
"duty to rear" he owes his offspring. This other duty is the so-called "conjugal
debt." Under both secular law (at least in Louisiana and other civil lawjurisdictions) and divine law, each spouse owes a duty to engage in sexual relations
with the other. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 98 ("Married persons owe each other
fidelity.... .") & cmt. (b) ("As used in this Article, the term 'fidelity' refers not only
to the spouses' duty to refrain from adultery, but also to their mutual obligation to
submit to each other's reasonable and normal sexual desires."); Code of Canon Law
can. 1135 (1983) ("To each spouse belongs an equal duty and right to that which
pertains to the community of conjugal life.") (my translation); The Code of Canon
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It may be objected that this argument fails to take proper account
of the reason for the would-be post mortem father's failure to fulfill
his duty to rear. He has, it might be argued, a legitimate "excuse,"
namely, that his inability to fulfill that duty is "beyond his control."
Unlike the typical "deadbeat dad," this one would very much like to
assume that duty and, one must suppose, would in fact fulfill that duty
if only he could.
Though no one could deny that such a distinction can be drawn
between the would-be post mortem father and the typical "deadbeat
dad," I do deny that this distinction makes any difference. This
distinction is not, as my hypothetical interlocutor supposes, one of
"kind," so that the would-be post mortem father, unlike the typical
deadbeat dad, can be regarded as entirelyfree offault. Rather, it is a
distinction of "degree": the would-be post mortem father is simply
less culpable than is his more typical counterpart. But culpable he
most certainly still is. The maxim formulated earlier, according to
which one who is not prepared to fulfill the responsibilities attached
to a certain position or status has "no business" occupying that
position or attaining that status, makes no distinction regarding "why"
one might not be prepared to fulfill those responsibilities. The
"wrong" that such a person commits has nothing to do with the
reason for his not "doing his job"; rather, the "wrong" is simply that
of his presuming to take on the job at all! The situation of such a
person is, in fact, is no different from that of a "lying promisor" who,
at the time at which he makes his promise, knows that he can not
fulfill it (because he lacks the wherewithal to do so). Such a promisor
is, to be sure, less culpable than is one who, though he has the means
to fulfill his promise, freely chooses, in advance of making the
promise, not to use those means. But he is nonetheless still, to a
significant degree, a "liar." In the same way, a would-bepost mortem
father is still, to a significant degree, a "deadbeat."
It might also be objected that my argument fails to take into
account the would-be post mortem father's so-called "right" to
Law: A Text and Commentary can. 1135, at 809 (James A. Coriden et al. eds.,
1985) ("... [T]he conjugal rights .... [T]here are certain basic elements which the
spouses have a right to expect from one another. First there is the right to
heterosexual acts. The sexual act is the most intimate and complete expression of
conjugal love... ."); I Corinthians 7:3 ("Let the husband render/pay [ato~t~oTo]
his debt/duty [o4tXTIV] to the wife and likewise also the wife to the husband.")
(my translation). Thus, if a husband who has been diagnosed with a terminal illness
or condition should abstain from sexual relations with his wife out of fear of
breaching his "duty to rear" his offspring, he would, in so doing, end up breaching
his "sexual duty" to his wife. How this "conflict of duties" should be resolved is a
truly difficult moral question, one that I'm not prepared to tackle at present. In any
event, one need not resolve this question before condemning post mortem
conception as immoral.
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reproduce himself. If this objection means something more than that
such a father has an "interest" in reproducing himself (which is only
a slightly more technical way of saying "he is likely to want it 'real
bad') 24 , then it means, I suppose, that he has some "natural right" to
reproduce. That such a natural right exists cannot be denied. But
what this "natural" right has to do with post mortem reproduction is
not at all clear. A "natural right" is, by definition, one that exists by
virtue of "nature" or, to put it another, more traditional way, one that
is enjoyed in "the state of nature." Now, it goes without saying that
"nature" knows nothing of post mortem reproduction: in the state of
nature, one's ability to reproduce comes to an end at one's death.
There, too, must end any supposed "natural right" to reproduce. Even
if this were not true-even if the supposed "natural right" of
reproduction could somehow entail the privilege of resorting to
"unnatural" means of reproduction- this right could not and should
not be treated as if it were some sort of "absolute" value before which
all other values must yield. This "natural right," as I've attempted to
show, is intimately and indissolubly connected with a "natural duty,"2' 5
24. As does every human being, the would-be post mortem father has a
legitimate interest (one grounded, no doubt, in a powerful natural instinct) in
reproducing himself, be it to promote his own personal satisfaction and fulfillment
or to assure the continuity of his "family line" or both. In addition to this "generic"
human interest in reproduction, he may well have a special "therapeutic" interest,
one that is a function of his unfortunate predicament: creating a child, a child that
will serve as a living memorial of his life together with his wife, may provide him
some measure of consolation in his final days. In addition, in his role as "husband"
to his wife, he has a legitimate interest in "giving" her a child, in facilitating her
wish to procreate: reproduction, after all, is one of the principal purposes of
marriage.
But one can (and I do) deny that these interests are so "great" that they somehow
"outweigh" the child's "interest" in being reared by both his parents. To begin with,
I doubt whether it even makes sense to talk about "balancing interests" in this way.
Many modem natural law theorists--chief among them, Germain Grisez and John
Finnis-have shown, at least to my satisfaction, that human "interests" of the kind
in question here are "incommensurable" and, therefore, cannot be effectively
compared, at least not in a way that could pretend to some measure of "objectivity."
See Germain Grisez, Against Consequentialism, 23 Am. J. Juris. 21, 29-49 (1978);
John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 111-18 (1981). Further, even if the
competing interests of the father and the child could be effectively compared, I
would deny that such a comparison could provide a sound theoretical basis for
answering the question of whetherpost mortem conception (or any other human act
or practice) is "moral." When it comes to moral reasoning, "cost-benefit analysis,"
like all of the other modem "consequentialist" derivatives of utilitarianism,
represents a theoretical dead end. See generally Grisez, Against Consequentialism,
supra this note; Finnis, Natural Law, supra this note, at 111-18; see also Jacques
Maritain, Moral Philosophy: An Historical and Critical Survey ofthe Great Systems
ch. 6, § I, no 3, at 94 (1964) ("I do not believe that moral philosophy has any
important lesson to learn from the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill.").
25. A senior colleague of mine, Professor Emeritus Robert Pascal, once
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namely, the duty of the right-holder to take care of that which results
from the exercise of the right. This duty conditions-indeed
limits--that ight, such that the right "ends" where the duty"begins. ''
For these reasons, then, the reform of § 391.1 must be condemned.
It sins twice. First, it leaves undone the good it ought to have done,
namely, to repeal the section. Second, it does what it ought not to have
done, namely, it expands opportunities as well as incentives for fathers
to act in violation of their natural duties toward their children.
B. Spousal Usufruct
1. In General (Testamentary & Legal): Security: Permissible
Forms
Prior to its revision in 1976, Chapter 2, Title I, Book II of the
Civil Code (which concerns the personal servitude of "usufruct")
included two articles-Articles 558 and 562-that, together, limited the
kinds of security that a usufructuary might post to two: suretyship and
special mortgage.17 In the revision, these articles were suppressed and
were not reproduced, not even in altered form. The point of suppressing
the articles, one must suppose, was to eliminate the limitation, in other
words, to allow the usufructuary to post whatever kind of security might
suggested to me that if the Enlightenment had never occurred, the moral theologians
and natural lawyers of the Roman church would eventually have developed some
theory of natural or innate "duties," one that would have paralleled, in at least some
sense, the natural/innate "rights" theories of Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke, and their
followers. It is interesting to speculate about what kind of political society might
have emerged had some such theory ever been developed and had it then taken root
in the popular consciousness (as the "rights" theories did in fact do, at least in the
West). In such a society, one would suppose, the perennial political question would
not have been, as it is in ours, under what circumstances and on what basis can the
community can justify to the individual its limitation of the individual's
natural/innate right to do this or that, but rather under what circumstances the
individual can justify to the community his defaulting on his natural/innate duty to
do this or that. And perhaps "liberty" would have been understood not as "freedom
from undue constraint to be or do what you want ," but rather "freedom from undue
constraint to be or do what you ought." Such a society would not be without its
charms.
26. I recognize that my critique of the "natural right" objection may not be
entirely consistent with the United States Supreme Court's current appreciation of
the supposed "fundamental right" of "sexual self-determination." That, however,
does not disturb me. The question I am trying to resolve is not one of federal
constitutional law, but rather one of social morality. In regard to moral reasoning,
the high court, as many of its decisions in the last several decades prove, can claim
no particular expertise.
27. See La. Civ. Code arts.; see also A.N. Yiannopoulos, Personal Servitudes
§ 117, at 243 & n.9, in Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (4th ed. 2000).
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seem appropriate in the discretion of the court. Out of concern that some
might fail to draw this inference, the redactors took the precaution of
stating it explicitly in a comment to one of the new articles: "The rules
adopted impose no limitations on the kinds of security that the
usufructuary may furnish."'28
Notwithstanding this revision, the point of which could hardly have
been clearer, doubts have persisted (at least in the minds of some legal
practitioners and perhaps of even a few judges) regarding what kinds of
security are permissible, in particular, whether the usufructuary can,
without the naked owner's consent, provide security other than that of
"suretyship." This is particularly true insofar as the so-called "spousal
usufruct" is concerned, with respect to which the standard practice has
long been and continues to be that the usufructuary should "post a bond."
During this past session, the legislature took action to quell these
lingering doubts, if only with respect to the spousal usufruct. This
action, which was accomplished via Act No. 1207, comprised (i) the
amendment of Article 1514 of the Civil Code, which since 1996 has
addressed the security that is required for the spousal usufruct, and (ii)
the enactment of a new § 1202 of Title 9 of the Revised Statutes (the so-
called "Civil Code Ancillaries"). The changes to the Civil Code Article
and the contents of the new Revised Statute are reflected in the
following chart:
Original Version
Art. 1514.
Usufruct of
surviving spouse
affecting legitime;
security
A forced heir
may request
security when a
usufruct in favor of
a surviving spouse
affects his legitime
and he is not a
child of the
surviving spouse.
A forced heir may
also request
Original Version
with Amendments
Art. 1514.
Usufruct of
surviving spouse
affecting legitime;
security
A forced heir
may request
security when a
usufruct in favor of
a surviving spouse
affects his legitime
and he is not a
child of the
surviving spouse.
A forced heir may
also request
Amended Version
Art. 1514. Usufruct
of surviving spouse
affecting legitime;
security
A forced heir may
request security when
a usufruct in favor of a
surviving spouse
affects his legitime and
he is not a child of the
surviving spouse. A
forced heir may also
request security to the
extent that a surviving
spouse's usufruct over
the legitime affects
28. La. Civ. Code art. 572 cmt. (b); see also Yiannopoulos, supra note 26, §
117, at 243.
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security to the
extent that a
surviving spouse's
usufruct over the
legitime affects
separate property.
security to the
extent that a
surviving spouse's
usufruct over the
legitime affects
separate property.
The court may
order the execution
of notes,
mortgages, or other
documents as it
deems necessary,
or may impose a
mortgage or lien
on either
community or
separate property,
movable or
immovable, as
securty.
§ 1202. Form of
security for legal
usufruct of
surviving spouse
If security is
owed to the naked
owner by the
usufructuary who
is the surviving
spouse, the court
may order the
execution of notes,
mortgages, or other
documents as it
deems necessary,
or may impose a
mortgage or lien
on either
community or
separate property.
movable or
immovable, as
security.
separate property. The
court may order the
execution of notes,
mortgages, or other
documents as it deems
necessary, or may
impose a mortgage or
lien on either
community or separate
property, movable or
immovable, as
security.
§ 1202. Form of
security for legal
usufruct of surviving
spouse
If security is owed
to the naked owner by
the usufructuary who
is the surviving
spouse, the court may
order the execution of
notes, mortgages, or
other documents as it
deems necessary, or
may impose a
mortgage or lien on
either community or
separate property,
movable or
immovable, as
security.
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The sole effect of the new legislation, as I have already explained,
is to make unmistakeably explicit that which, for one properly trained
in the art of interpreting a Civil Code, should already have been
obvious. As a general rule, legislation of this kind should be resisted,
for it clutters up the code with unnecessary detail 29 and, further, it
rewards (and therefore tends to perpetuate) the failure of those who
clamor for it to develop proper interpretive skills. In this case,
however, an exception to that general rule may well have been
warranted. Prior to the amendment some policymakers, fearing that
spousal usufructuaries might not be permitted to put up security in
some less onerous form than "bonds" and that at least some spousal
usufructuaries might not be able to bear that burden successfully, had
begun to entertain proposals to scale back, if not eliminate entirely, the
security requirement for such usufructuaries.3 ° These proposals, as I
shall argue later on in this Article, are for the most part imprudent.3'
The new legislation, by making it clear that the spousal usufructuary
need not "post a bond," may remove some of the "pressure" that some
policymakers feel to adopt proposals of this kind.
29. The words of Portalis, the "father" of the French Code Civil, see Henri
Capitant, Portalis: le P~re du Code Civil, 56 Rev. Crit. Leg. Jur. 187 (1936), though
uttered over 200 years ago now, still constitute sound advice for those who would
undertake the awesome task of codification today:
We also kept clear of the dangerous ambition of wanting to forecast and
regulate everything. Who would imagine that those to whom a code
always seems too voluminous are the very people who dare imperiously
to assign the lawmaker the arduous task of leaving nothing to the
discretion of the judge?
No matter what we do, positive laws could never entirely replace the use
of natural reason in the affairs of life. Society's needs are so varied, the
intercourse between men so active, their interests so manifold, and their
relations so extensive that the legislator cannot possibly provide for all
eventualities.
In the very matters that particularly call for his attention, there is
a host of details which either escape him or are too much open to
contention or instability to become the subject of a legal provision.
The role of legislation is to set, by taking a broad approach, the
general propositions of the law, to establish principles which will
be fertile in application, and not to get down to the details of
question which may arise in particular instances.
Discours Priliminaire, in 1 P.A. Fenet, Recueil Complet des Travaux
Preparatoires du Code Civil 469-70 (1827), reprinted (in translation) in
Alain Levasseur, Code Napoleon or Code Portalis?, 43 Tul. L. Rev. 762,
769 (Shael Herman trans., 1969).
30. In fact, at least one of these proposals has already become law. In Act No.
548 (which amends La. Civ. Code. art. 1499), the legislature relieved testamentary
spousal usufructuaries of the duty to post security, save in certain limited
circumstances. That act is discussed infra in Part I.B.2.a.
31. See infra pp.339-45 and 349-50.
[Vol. 64
Even if it was, all things considered, wise for the legislature to try
to "clear up" lingering doubts about the kinds of security to which a
spousal usufructuary may resort, one can still quarrel with the
particular form that this clarification assumed. In terms of the
legislative technique that it exhibits, Act No. 1207 can be faulted on
several scores.
First, the act is internally redundant, or so it would at first appear.
The act seems to say the same thing twice, once in the form of an
amendment to a Civil Code Article (1514) and then again in the form
of a new Revised Statute (1202): aside from its introductory clause,
the latter is, in fact, a verbatim reproduction of the former. Surely the
legislature need not speak twice to achieve its wishes. And so, one
is entitled to ask why it did so (or appears to have done so) here. The
explanation lies in the legislature's recognition that Article 1514, as
it was last revised in 1996, is of indeterminate scope, to be precise,
one cannot be sure whether the Article applies to legal, as well as
testamentary, spousal usufructs. The cause of this uncertainty
(technical deficiencies in the 1996 revision) will be reviewed later in
this paper. Suffice it to say for now that the uncertainty is real and
that it remains unresolved. Hence it was that the legislature, having
decided that it wanted the "new" rule regarding the permissible forms
of security for spousal usufructs to apply to legal as well as
testamentary usufructs, felt that it could not safely "stop" at amending
Article 1514 (which might, after all, end up being interpreted so as to
apply only to testamentary usufructs), but had to "go on" to create a
new "parallel" statute that specifically addresses "legal" usufructs
(note the reference in the caption of § 1202 to "legal usufruct"). As
a matter of legislative technique, this solution to the problem is, of
course, less than ideal: it would have been better for the legislature to
have revised Article 1514 to eliminate the uncertainty. But the
legislature cannot be expected to "fix" everything at once, and as a
"stop-gap" measure, this solution is perhaps not intolerable.
Second, the act contains phrasing that is, in some respects, less
than felicitous and, in others, down right perplexing. For example, the
act, in describing the property on which a spousal usufructuary may
create a mortgage, speaks of "community or separate property,
movable or immovable." In standard English (as opposed to, say,
standard French or Spanish), the noun follows the adjective, unless
the adjective is part of a predicate nominative or an adjectival relative
clause. Thus, a permissible phrasing would have been "community
or separate, movable or immovable, property" or, perhaps, "property
that is community or separate, movable or immovable," but never
this. Then, in the part of the legislation that describes the kinds of
security interests that the court may "impose" (itself, a curious usage),
there is the reference to "mortgage or lien." Surely it would have
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been sufficient to use one term or the other. Finally, there's the
curious reference to "notes" in the part of the legislation that
describes the kinds of documents the execution of which the court
may order. Just what "notes" the legislature had in mind here is less
than immediately clear. It is possible that the term refers to some
kind of conditional promissory note made by the usufructuary in favor
of the naked owner, perhaps something that reads like this: "If I
default on my duties as usufructuary, then I will pay you $X." Now,
this is a peculiar form of "security" indeed, for it is not, in fact,
"security" at all in the true sense of the word (that is, "real security,"
such as a mortgage or a pledge, or "personal security," that is,
suretyship). Except for the fact that such a note would fix in advance
the amount of the payment that the usufructuary would have to make
to the naked owner in the event of his default (thereby acting as a
kind of "liquidated damages" clause), it would do nothing but
reproduce, in conventional form, a duty that the usufructuary already
owes the naked owner as a matter of law: under Article 573 of the
Civil Code, the usufructuary is by law "answerable for losses
resulting from his fraud, fault, or neglect."
2. Particular Types of Spousal Usufruct
a. Testamentary Spousal Usufruct: When Security is Required
In Louisiana, it is not uncommon for a married person, when
planning for the disposition of his estate, to provide for his surviving
spouse by granting her a "usufruct" over all or some of the property
that he shall leave at the time of his death. For the past several years
(at least since 1996), there has been some uncertainty regarding
whether and, if so, under what circumstances the holder of a such a
"testamentary spousal usufruct" is required to post security. To this
question, there were at least two possible answers.32
One-the more obvious-was that such a usufructuary had to
post security unless the creator of the usufruct provided to the
contrary. The argument in support of this answer rested on two
premises. The major premise was drawn from Articles 571 and 573
of the Civil Code, which set forth the general rules regarding security
for usufructs. According to those Articles, holders of "conventional"
usufructs, in contrast to holders of "legal" usufructs, are required to
post security, unless the creator of the usufruct grants the holder a
32. See generally Yiannopoulos, supra note 26, § 194, at 399-400; Dian T.
Arruebarrena, Property Changes in the Proposed Successions Revision, 57 La. L.
Rev. 149, 162-63 (1996).
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dispensation.33 The minor premise was based on the seemingly
reasonable assumption that all spousal usufructs granted by testament,
without exception, should be qualified as "conventional."34
The other possible answer-the less obvious-was that the
usufructuary did not have to post security at all unless some "forced
heir" were entitled to and did request it or the creator of the usufruct
were to require it. This answer was based on Civil Code Article
1514, which was enacted in 1996. That Article provided (and still
provides) as follows:
A forced heir may request security when a usufruct in favor
of a surviving spouse affects his legitime and he is not a child
of the surviving spouse. A forced heir may also request
security to the extent that a surviving spouse's usufruct over
the legitime affects separate property.
It is undisputed that this Article was intended to apply, at a minimum,
to testamentary spousal usufructs.35 Now, the very fashion in which
this Article was written, at least in the minds of some, suggested that,
as a general rule, no security had to be provided: the Article, by
authorizing certain persons under certain circumstances to request
security, seems to presuppose that otherwise no security would be
required. Buttressing this interpretation of Article 1514 was its
history. As the comments to the Article indicate, this Article was
supposed to "reenact[ ] the provisions of the last paragraph of Civil
Code Article 890" as it had read up until 1996.36 That paragraph had
then read as follows:
If the usufruct authorized by this Article affects the rights of
heirs other than children of the marriage between the
33. See La. Civ. Code art. 571 ("The usufructuary shall give security that he
will use the property subject to the usufruct as a prudent administrator and that he
will faithfully fulfill all the obligations imposed on him by law or by the act that
established the usufruct unless security is dispensed with.") & art. 573 ("Security
may be dispensed with by the grantor of the usufruct or by operation of law. Legal
usufructuaries, and sellers or donors of property under reservation of usufruct, are
not required to give security.").
34. This assumption, strangely enough, did not become plausible until the
Revision of 1996. Before that revision, it was possible for at least some "spousal
usufructs" created by testament to be qualified as "legal," namely, those that merely
"confirmed" the legal spousal usufruct that is provided for in Article 890 of the
Civil Code. Whether the 1996 revision eliminated this possibility, as its proponents
claim it did, is still disputed. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 26, § 194, at 395-99;
Arruebarrena, supra note 31, at 160-63.
35. It is disputed, however, whether the reach of this Article extends as well to
legal spousal usufructs. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 26, § 194, at 399-400;
Arreubarrena, supra note 31, at 162-63.
36. La. Civ. Code art. 1514 cmt. (c).
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deceased and the surviving spouse or affects separate
property, security may be requested by the naked owner.
Now, the "usufruct authorized by this Article" (that is, old Article
890) to which this paragraph referred was, according to the very terms
of the Article, a "legal" usufruct. 3' As such, that usufruct, save under
the circumstances spelled out in this paragraph, required no security
at all.38 If, as the comments to Article 1514 indicated, this new
Article merely reproduced the provisions of the old, then the new
Article likewise should not require security unless a naked
owner/forced heir should demand it.
This past summer, the legislature finally resolved this uncertainty
in favor of the latter alternative. The legislature's action took the
form of Act No. 548 of the Regular Session of 2003, which amends
Article 1499 of the Civil Code, the Article that, since 1996, has
served to provide authority for the creation of testamentary usufructs
in favor of surviving spouses. The changes in the Article that were
effected by the amendment are depicted in the following chart:
37. By classifying all of the usufructs to which the old Article applied as
"legal," the legislature was, in fact, guilty of distorting well-recognized juridical
categories. As was noted in note 34 and will be further explained in the following
note, not all of the usufructs to which the old Article applied were, by nature,
"legal"; to the contrary, the old Article also governed a number ofkinds ofusufructs
that were, by nature, "conventional." The reason that the legislature distorted the
categories--called some "conventional" usufiucts "legal"-was that it wanted to
attach to all of the usufructs governed by the old Article, regardless of the true
nature of those usufructs, the effects that are normally reserved for legal usufructs
alone, including the usual rule that a "legal" usufructuary need not put up security.
See generally Yiannopoulos, supra note 26, § 194, at 396-98; Arruebarrena, supra
note 31, at 161.
38. The fault for this interpretive uncertainty lies with the redactors of new
Article 1514. Prior to the creation of Articles 1499 and 1514, which took place
simultaneously with the amendment of Article 890, old Article 890 was a hodge-
podge of provisions that dealt with "spousal" usufructs, some of which genuinely
amounted to legal usufructs ("true legal usufructs"), others of which were, in fact,
testamentary usufructs that, for various reasons (most of them related to taxes), were
assimilated to legal usufructs in terms of their effects ("faux legal usufructs"). One
of the principal objectives of the legislation that produced new Articles 1499 and
1514 and amended old Article 890-an objective that was itself salutary-was to
"separate out" the provisions of old Article 890 that applied to true legal usufructs
from those that applied to faux legal usufructs. The plan for realizing this objective
was as follows: put the provisions that dealt with the faux legal usufructs into new
Articles (among them, 1499 and 1514) that would be situated in the part of the Civil
Code that deals with impingements on the legitime (itself a less than obvious choice
of location) and leave those that dealt with true legal usufructs in Article 890. On
the assumption that the provisions in the last paragraph of old Article 890 applied
only to faux legal usufructs, the architects of the revision relocated that paragraph
among the new Articles. Sadly, this assumption was mistaken. That paragraph
applied, at once, both to true and to faux legal usufructs-primarily to the former.
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Original Version
Art. 1499.
Usufruct to
surviving spouse
The decedent
may grant a
usufruct to the
surviving spouse
over all or part of
his property,
including the
forced portion,
and may grant the
usufructuary the
power to dispose
of nonconsum-
ables as provided
in the law of
usufruct. The
usufruct shall be
for life unless
expressly
designated for a
shorter period.
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Original Version
with Amendments
Art. 1499.
Usufruct to
surviving spouse
The decedent
may grant a
usufruct to the
surviving spouse
over all or part of
his property,
including the
forced portion,
and may grant the
usufructuary the
power to dispose
of nonconsum-
ables as provided
in the law of
usufruct. The
usufruct shall be
for life unless
expressly
designated for a
shorter period,
and shall not
require security
except as
expressly declared
by the decedent or
as permitted when
the legitime is
affected.
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Amended Version
Art. 1499.
Usufruct to
surviving spouse
The decedent
may grant a
usufruct to the
surviving spouse
over all or part of
his property,
including the
forced portion,
and may grant the
usufructuary the
power to dispose
of nonconsum-
ables as provided
in the law of
usufruct. The
usufruct shall be
for life unless
expressly
designated for a
shorter period,
and shall not
require security
except as
expressly declared
by the decedent or
as permitted when
the legitime is
affected.
The new legislation clarifies the law at two points. First, when
a usufruct is created by testament under the auspices of Article
1499, the usufructuary is not, as a general rule, required to post
security. Second, to this general rule, there are two and only two
exceptions: (i) where the testator expressly requires that the
usufructuary post security and (ii) where a forced heir, pursuant to
a faculty granted to him by legislation (specifically, Article 1514),
demands that the usufructuary post security.
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Though the amendment to Article 1499 appears to be technically
sound, one can question its soundness as a matter of policy.
Exempting the holder of an Article 1499 usufruct from the duty to
post security would perhaps be an acceptable general rule were that
general rule to be accompanied by appropriate exceptions. But it is
precisely here that the amended version of Article 1499 falls short.
To be sure, the two exceptions that are recognized-(i) that which
permits a naked owner who is a forced heir of the de cujus, but not a
child of the usufructuary (in other words, where the naked owners are
forced heirs and they and the usufructuary are, respectively, step-
children and step-parent) to request security and (ii) that which
permits a naked owner who is a forced heir of the de cujus, to the
extent that the usufruct attaches to de cujus' separate property, to
request security-are good as far as they go. The trouble is that the
former of these exceptions doesn't go far enough. It is not enough to
permit the de cujus' forced heirs to request security when the
usufructuary is a step-parent; rather, one should go farther by
according this privilege to any and all of the de cujus' descendants,
regardless whether they are forced heirs, under such circumstances.
In other words, any time that the naked owners and the usufructuary
are, respectively, step-children and step-parent, the naked owners
should be entitled to demand security.
My argument in support of this admittedly controversial
proposition3 9 starts from a premise that, at least for those who know
of the civil law of usufruct, should not be controversial at all: as a
general rule, every usufructuary ought to have to provide security for
the benefit of the naked owners. This general rule, which has been
around for nearly 2000 years4' (at least) and is still in place in most
civil law jurisdictions4 (Louisiana included42), rests on a solid
39. As of this writing, the Council of the Louisiana Law Institute has taken up
this question on a couple of occasions. On the most recent of these occasions, the
council, by a closely divided vote, rejected the proposition for which I am now
arguing.
40. See Digest ofJustinian bk. VII, tit. I, law 13, in 3 The Civil Law 232 (S.P.
Scott trans., 1932) ("Where the usufruct in any property has been bequeathed, the
owner can demand security for the property, and this can be done by order of the
court, for just as the usufructuary has a right to use and enjoyment, so also the mere
[naked] owner has a right to be secure with reference to his property. This also
applies to every usufruct, as Julianus states .. ... ") (attributed to Ulpian's On
Sabinus bk. XVIII). Julian and Ulpian were among the jurisconsults of the so-
called "classical period" of Roman law, which stretched from 100 to 250 A.D.
Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law 29-30 & 34 (1979).
41. This is true, at least, ofjurisdictions within the "Latin" subtradition of the
civil law. See, e.g., C6digo Civil (Argentina) art. 2851 ("The usufructuary, before
entering into the use of the thing that is subject to the usufruct, must give security
that [i] he will enjoy it and conserve it in conformity with legislation and [ii] that
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he will completely fulfill all the obligations that are imposed on him by this Code
or by the title that establishes the usufruct, and that he will return the thing at the
end of the usufruct .... "); C6digo Civil (Brazil) art. 1400 ("The usufructuary,
before assuming the usufruct, ... will give security, be in personal or real, if he is
required to do so, that he will stand watch over their conservation and will deliver
them at the end of the usufruct."); C6digo Civil (Chile) art. 775 ("The usufructuary
cannot have the thing to which the usufruct attaches without having provided
security sufficient for [its] conservation and restitution .... "); Code Civil (France)
art. 601 ("He [the usufructuary] [must] give security that he will enjoy the things as
a prudent administrator . . . ."); Codice Civile (Italy) art. 1002, par. 3 ("The
usufructuary must also give suitable security.... ."); C6digo Civil (Mexico) art.
1006 ("The usufructuary, before entering into the enjoyment of the goods, is
obligated: ... II. To give appropriate security that he will make use of the things
with moderation and will restore them to the [naked] owner, with their accessions,
at the extinction of the usufruct, without their having been impaired or deteriorated
by his negligence .... "); C6digo Civil (Portugal) art. 1468 ("Before taking account
of the goods, the usufructuary must: ... b) Provide security, if it is required of him,
as much for the restitution of the goods or of their value, if they are consumable, as
for the reparation of deteriorations that they may come to suffer by his fault, or for
the payment of whatsoever other indemnity he may owe."); Quebec Civil Code art.
1144 (".... [T]he usufructuary shall... take out insurance or furnish other security
to the bare [naked] owner to guarantee performance of his obligations . . .");
C6digo Civil (Spain) art. 491 (Julio Romanach trans. 1994) ("Before entering upon
the enjoyment of the property, the usufructuary is bound ... 2. To give bond,
committing himself to perform the obligations pertaining to him pursuant to this
section.").
There the usufructuary is not required to post security as a matter of course; to the
contrary, the naked owner must affirmatively demand it and, in order to get it, must
show that the usufructuary's use of the property somehow imperils his rights. See,
e.g., Burgerliches Gesetzbuch (German) § 1051 (Ian S. Forrester et al. trans. 1975)
("The [naked] owner may demand security if the conduct of the usufructuary gives
ground for apprehension of a substantial violation of the [naked] owner's rights.").
As for the Swiss and the Greeks, they've adopted a hybrid approach. To
usufructs of nonconsumables they apply the German rule (security available only
for cause), but to usufructs of consumables they apply the Latin rule (security
available of right). See Code Civil (Switzerland) art. 760, 1 & 2 ("The [naked]
owner who proves that his rights are in peril can require security from the
usufructuary. He can require it, even without this proof and before delivery, if the
usufruct bears on consumable things or securities."); AotiiKoq Kwbt (Greek)
ap0q. 1159 ("If the usufruct is exercised in such a manner as to compromise
gravely the rights of the [naked] owner, the [naked] owner has the right, in the
absence of a different stipulation, to require that the usufructuary furnish security
. ") & 1175 ("In the matter of consumable things, the usufructuary is bound, in
the absence of a different stipulation, to furnish security before their delivery...
."1).
42. See La. Civ. Code art. 571 (rev. 1976) ("The usufructuary shall give
security that he will use the property subject to the usufruct as a prudent
administrator and that he will faithfully fulfill all the obligations imposed on him by
law or by the act that established the usufruct unless security is dispensed with.");
La. Civ. Code art. 558 (1870) ("The usufructuary must give security that he will
use, as a prudent administrator would do, the movables and immovables subject to
the usufruct, and that he will faithfully fulfill all the obligations imposed on him by
2004]
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"common sense" policy judgment. Because the obligations that the
usufructuary owes to the naked owner-to preserve and return the
thing, if it is nonconsumable; to replace the thing or its value, if it is
consumable-are so onerous and because these obligations, at least
in the normal case, do not "come due" until the usufructuary is dead
and gone, there is a signficant risk that the usufructuary will shirk
these obligations unless he is provided with a powerful incentive to
fulfill them.
Because the general rule that requires security from every
usufructuary serves such a salutary end, civil law legislators have,
through the years, recognized exceptions to that rule only reluctantly
and then only for good cause. Perhaps the most commonly invoked
of these "good causes" is this: owing to the special nature of the
relationship between the naked owner, on the one hand, and the
usufructuary, on the other, one could expect the usufructuary to fulfill
her "fiduciary" obligations toward the naked owner without the
incentive provided by security. This, in fact, is the reason behind the
exception to the general security requirement for "legal usufructs."43
Take, for example, the legal "parental" usufruct-that which married
parents enjoy over certain property of their minor children." In the
case of such a usufruct, it is believed, there really is no need to
require the usufructuary to post security: by virtue of the parents'
"natural affection" toward their own offspring, the parents will (at
least in the general run of cases) conscientiously fulfill their fiduciary
obligations toward their children anyway. 5
law, and by the title under which hir usufruct is established."); La. Civ. Code art.
551 (1825) (same); Digest bk. 2, tit. 3, art. 23, par. 1 (1808) ("The usufructuary
must give security in the amount of the inventory, as a guarantee that he will enjoy
the inventoried as a prudent administrator, if these are immovables; that he will
return them in the condition in which they will be found, without any deterioration
due to either his fraud or his fault, if the inventoried items are ordinary movables;
and that he will restore the equivalent of the estimated value that has been made of
them in the inventory, if these are things that are subject to being consumed by
usage.").
43. See La. Civ. Code art. 573 ("Legal usufructuaries ... are not required to
give security.").
44. See La. Civ. Code art. 223.
45. See Diane M. Lloyd, Comment, New Hope for the Survivor: The Changes
in the Usufruct of the Surviving Spouse, 28 Loy. L. Rev. 1095, 1103 & 1113-14
(1982); see also Succession of Lee, 9 La. Ann. 398, 399 (1854) ("The motive of the
Legislature in giving the usufruct, where there were children of the marriage, may
well have been to keep the family estate together, and provide a common home
during the lifetime of the surviving father or mother, who would naturally use the
estate with an eye to the welfare of the children, at all events until a second
marriage; upon which event the lawgiver, with a jealous foresight for the children's
welfare, arrests the usufruct.") (emphasis added); Hall v. Toussaint, 52 La. Ann.
1763, 1767, 28 So. 304, 305 (1900) (paraphrasing Lee).
340 [Vol. 64
J.-R. TRAHAN
Now, where the usufructuary is a step-parent of the naked owners,
there is no such "good cause" for recognizing an exception to the
general security requirement. Though there are, of course,
exceptions, relationships between step-parents and step-children tend
to be notably less harmonious than relationships between parents and
children by blood." This is so even when the affinitive who binds
them together is still alive; once he is gone, the situation often gets
even worse. It is not an accident that a disproportionate percentage
of the "successions cases" decided by our appellate courts each year
consists of contests between step-relations. For these reasons, one
would be naive indeed to suppose that, as a general rule, step-parent
usufructuaries can simply be "trusted" to tend to their fiduciary duties
toward their step-children naked owners without the "assistance" of
some external incentive (such as security)." And, because that is so.
the general security requirement ought to be retained in such cases. 4'
It is interesting to note that the history of the law of "spousal
usufructs" in Louisiana supports this policyjudgment. Back in 1844,
when the Louisiana Legislature first recognized a legal spousal
usufruct, the surviving spouse received that usufruct only if and to the
extent that the naked owners were her own children. The original
legislation read as follows:
In all cases, when the predeceased husband or wife shall have
left issue ofthe marriage with the survivor, and shall not have
disposed by last will and testament, of his or her share in the
community property, the survivor shall hold a [in] usufruct,
during his or her natural life, so much of the share of the
deceased in such community property as may be inherited by
49such issue. ...
Thus, at this early point in Louisiana's legal history, the only way that
a step-parent could have received a usufruct on property of which her
step-children were naked owners was by testament, in other words,
as a volitional usufruct. And that volitional usufruct, of course,
unlike the legal usufruct established by this new legislation, would
have been subject to the general security requirement.
To legislators, judges, and lawyers of the time, this distinction
between blood parents and step-parents made perfectly good sense.
46. The troubles that beset step-relations, together with their biological,
psychological, and sociological causes, are ably reviewed in Katherine S. Spaht,
The Remnant ofForcedHeirship: The Interrelationship of Undue Influence, What's
Become ofDisinherison, and the Unfinished Business of the Stepparent Usufruct,
60 La. L. Rev. 637, 653-54, 661-69 (2000).
47. See id. at 664-69, 671 & 673.
48. Lloyd, supra note 44, at 1103 & 1113-14.
49. See La. R.S. §§ 629 & 3708.
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The distinction was noted, with approval, in Hall v. Toussaint ° at the
turn of the century:
... The textual provisions of the law are that the surviving
partner in community has [a] usufruct of [the] share of [the]
deceased spouse who died without having ascendants or
descendants. Here the deceased left a descendant, viz.
plaintiff.... [T]hat usufruct, where there are children of the
marriage, may have been to keep the family estate together,
and provide a home for the surviving father or mother, who,
in the nature of things, uses the estate with an eye to the
welfare of the children. It is manifest that the impulse is no
longer the same between the daughter and the stepmother,
and the nature of the law finds nothing to sustain it in such a
case.
5 1
Years later, in 1981, the Louisiana Legislature, its suspicion of
step-parents apparently having waned somewhat, decided to expand
the scope of the legal "spousal" usufruct so as to make it available to
step-parents as well as blood parents. But in so doing, the legislators
were careful to add a special security requirement for the step-parent
usufruct,52 one that read as follows:
If the usufruct authorized by this Article affects the rights of
heirs other than children of the marriage between the
deceased and the surviving spouse .... security may be
requested by the naked owner.
What the creation of this special security requirement shows is that
the legislators, though they trusted step-parents "more" in 1981 than
they had in 1844, still did not trust them enough to give them a
usufruct free of security. The legislators still recognized, in other
words, that step-parents could not necessarily be counted on to "do
the right thing" by their step-children."
This state of affairs did not change until the revision of the law of
successions in 1996. In that year, the Louisiana Legislature
simultaneously repealed the special security requirement for the
step-parental spousal usufruct and created a new one, one set out in
new Civil Code Article 1514: "A forced heir may request security
when a usufruct in favor of a surviving spouse affects his legitime
and he is not a child of the surviving spouse." Precisely why the
legislators made this change is not entirely clear. It is possible,
50. 52 La. Ann. 1763, 28 So. 304 (1900).
51. Id. at 1767, 28 So. at 305 (emphasis added).
52. See Lloyd, supra note 44, at 1113-14.
53. Id.
[Vol. 64
J.-R. TRAHAN
however, that they made the change, as it were, unknowingly,
specifically, that they did not fully appreciate that they were
changing the law. This hypothesis rests on the content of the
"official revision comments" that accompanied new Civil Code
Article 1514, comments that were included with the projet for this
legislation as it was submitted to the legislators. According to those
comments, there was, in fact, no substantive difference between the
old law and the new:
This Article essentially reenacts the provisions of the last
paragraph of Civil Code Article 890 . . . . Article 890
expanded the law by which its predecessor Article 916
(1870) granted a usufruct to a surviving spouse that would
terminate upon the death or remarriage of the surviving
spouse, but only as to community property inherited by issue
of the marriage. Civil Code Article 916 did not authorize a
usufruct over community property that was inherited by
children of a prior marriage . . . . When the law was
expanded to permit a testator to grant such a usufruct to a
surviving spouse, the last paragraph of Article 890 [the
special security provision for the step-parental legal
usufruct] was also added to authorize the naked owner in
those instances to request security.... The legislature made
a policy decision that children of a prior marriage ... are
entitled to greater protection than are children of the
marriage, or, in other words, to treat a surviving spouse who
is the parent of the naked owner different [sic] from a
surviving spouse who is not the parent of the naked owner.
This Article continues that policy, but the language has been
revised slightly and the provision itself has been
appropriately moved to a different section of the code ....
The message that the comments conveyed to the legislators, then,
is "this does not change the substance of the law."
That message, however, was erroneous. Unlike the former law
(the law as revised in 1981), which accorded the right to demand
security to any descendant who was not a child of the usufructuary,
the new law (the law as revised in 1996) accords that right only to
any forced heir who is not a child of the usufructuary. And, by
1996, the category "forced heir" became quite a bit narrower than
the category "descendant."54
54. See La. Civ. Code art. 1493 (rev. 1996) (re-defining forced heirs as
"descendants of the first degree" who, upon the death of the de cujus, either (i) are
under twenty-four years of age or (ii) due to some "mental incapacity or physical
infirmity," are "permanently incapable" of caring for themselves or their property).
2004)
LOUISIANA LA W RE VIEW
It might be argued in rebuttal that, insofar as the category
"descendants" and the category "forced heirs" were, up until 1996,
co-terminous, the old law had, in fact, as the comments implied,
existed solely to protect the legitimes of forced heirs from predation
by their step-parents. But that, too, would be an error. The truth is
that the old law had protected descendants qua descendants not qua
forced heirs. A few illustrations may help to demonstrate my point.
First, imagine a man Y, who is the husband of a woman X (his
second wife) and the father of two children, A and B, by his first
marriage to another woman Z. Before his death, Y makes no
donations to anyone. At the time of his death, he leaves an estate that
consists of $400,000 (his halfof a "community" worth $800,000). He
leaves no testament. Because there are no conceivable
"impingements" on the "legitimes" of A and B here, they, though
"forced heirs," would not have been in a position to assert reduction.
Nevertheless, they would have been entitled, as descendants of Y, to
demand that X, as the usufructuary of Y's half of the former
community property (all that which they inherited from Y- 400,000
dollars' worth), post security. Not only that, but this right to demand
security would have gone beyond that which might have been
theoretically necessary to protect their "forced portion." Under the
law of forced heirship in place at that time, that forced portion would
have stood at $200,000 (1/2 of the active mass of $400,000); the other
$200,000 would have constituted an "extra portion." And yet, A and
B would have been entitled to demand that Y post security for her
usufruct even with respect to this "extra portion."
Next, imagine the same man Y, with the same family, but with
different property. This time, Y, before his death, donates $100,000
to A and $100,000 to B, out of his separate property, but otherwise
makes no donations to anyone. At his death, his net estate is worth
another $200,000 (his half of a "community" worth $400,000). He
leaves no testament. Because there are here no conceivable
"impingements" on the "legitimes" of A and B here, they, though
"forced heirs," would not have been in a position to assert reduction.
Nevertheless, they would have been entitled, as descendants of Y, to
demand that X, as the usufructuary of Y's half of the former
community property (all that which they inherited from Y-200,000
dollars' worth), post security. And, as before, this right to demand
security would have gone beyond that which might have been
theoretically necessary to protect their "forced portion." Indeed, this
right would have had nothing whatsoever to do with their forced
portion! Under the law of forced heirship that was then in place, that
forced portion would have stood at $200,000 (1/2 of an active mass
of $400,000, formed by "fictitiously collating" back to the $200,000
in assets he actually left at death the $200,000 in donations he had
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made before his death 5 ), so that A and B each would have had a
legitime of $100,000. Now, thanks to imputation (the donation of
$100,000 to A would be imputed to his account; that to B, imputed
to his account),56 the legitimes would have been deemed to have
already been satisfied, which would mean that, of the $200,000 (Y's
/2 of the "community") that they would have received from Y's
estate, all of it would have been for them an "extra portion."
Notwithstanding this-notwithstanding that not one dime of the
community property that they would have inherited would have fallen
within their legitimes-, still they would have been entitled to
demand security from X, as the usufructuary of that property.
55. See La. Civ. Code art. 1505, par. 2.
56. lam assuming here that the enactment in 1996 of Civil Code Article 1501,
which expressly required that certain inter vivos liberalities made by the de cujus
to the forced heir be "imputed" to the forced heir's legitime as a prerequisite to
reduction, did not change the law, that is, that "the law" of forced heirship in
Louisiana has always entailed such a requirement. I make this assumption even
though I recognize that, prior to that time, no legislative text even so much as
alluded to the institution of "imputation of liberalities" to forced heirs much less
established it on a firm footing. My assumption rests on what I know of the law of
forced heirship in France, on which Louisiana's law of forced heirship was closely
modeled. Like the parts of the Louisiana Civil Codes of 1808, 1825, and 1870 that
pertained to forced heirship, the parts of the original French Code Civil that
pertained to forced heirship said nothing whatsoever, not even by implication, about
"imputation of liberalities" to forced heirs. See French Civil Code arts. 864-868
& 913-930 (1804); see also 5 Marcel Planiol & Georges Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de
Droit Civil Frangais: Donations et Testaments no. 85, at 108 (Andr6 Trasbot &
Yvon Loussouarn revs., 2d ed. 1957) ("The difficulty [regarding imputation] is all
the greater inasmuch as the Code Civil is far from settling the question expressly
and clearly...."); 12 Frangois Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil Frangais no. 103,
at 142 (2d ed. 1876) ("The calculation [of the mass] is very simply ... After that,
a very difficult question [regarding imputation] arises, one that the Code Civil has
not resolved textually. .. .") And yet both the doctrine and the jurisprudence in
France consistently recognized that imputation of liberalities was an indispensable
prerequisite to reduction. See, e.g., Planiol & Ripert, supra this note, nos. 85-98,
at 107-20; 11 Aubry & Rau, Droit Civil Frangais § 684ter, at 55-70 (Paul Esmein
rev., 6th ed. 1956); 1 Gabriel Baudry-Lacantinerie & Maurice Colin, Des Donations
et Des Testaments nos. 924-64, at 431-48, in 9 Trait6 Th6orique et Pratique de
Droit Civil (2d ed. 1905); Laurent, supra this note, nos 103-136, at 141-82; 2
Raymond Troplong, Droit Civil Expliqu6: Des Donations Entre-Vifs et des
Testaments no. 891, at 280 (3d ed. 1872); 3 Victor Marcad6, Explication Th6orique
et Pratique de Code Napol6on no. 597, at 484 (5th ed. 1859); 7 Alexandre
Duranton, Cours de Droit Frangais nos. 367-69, at 403-04 (3d ed. 1834); see also
3 Jean Grenier, Trait6 des Donations, des Testamens et de Toutes Autres
Dispositions Gratuites no. 597, at 467-72 (4th ed. 1826) (tracing this rule to the
works of the great commentators on the law of the French ancien rdgime, Ricard,
Lebrun, Ferri~re, and Dumoulin). French scholars and judges justified recognizing
this seemingly extra-codal institution on the ground that it was somehow implied
by or inherent in the very system of the law of forced heirship itself. Now, if that
was true of French law, it could perhaps have been true of Louisiana law was well.
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One cannot help but wonder whether the legislators, had they
fully recognized the magnitude of the change that had been proposed
to them-that it would transmogrify a right of security that had
theretofore operated in favor of step-children regardless of and
independently of their rights as forced heirs into one that would
protect step-children only if and to the extent that they were forced
heirs-would have agreed to it. It is at least possible that they would
not have.
Be that as it may, even if it could be established that the
legislators fully understood and knowingly approved of this change,
I would still dare to argue that they made a mistake. Between 1981
-the year in which the legislators decided that step-parents could
not, as a general rule, be trusted with the responsibilities of
usufructuaries without the guarantee of security-and 1996-the year
in which the legislators approved the change, there did not take place,
to my knowledge, any great change in the character or quality of step-
relationships. To be sure, there were, by 1996, more such
relationships, thanks to the intervening explosion in divorce and
remarriage. 7 But relationships of that kind were just as troubled then
as they had been in 1981. If step-parents couldn't be trusted in 1981,
then they could not (and should not) have been trusted in 1996 either.
The same, of course, could be said of them in 2003.
One might object that this argument of mine fails to appreciate
fully the complexity of the difficulties posed by step-relations, in
particular, that it fails to take into account the fact that the possibility
ofmistreatment within step-relations is bilateral rather than unilateral.
The argument might looks something like this. Just as step-parents
cannot necessarily be trusted to do right by their step-children, so also
step-children cannot necessarily be trusted to do right by their step-
parents. Indeed, it is possible that step-children might even turn the
security requirement, which was originally designed as a shield to be
used when their step-parents try to injure them, into a sword whereby
they might try to injury their step-parents. For example, the step-
children might well invoke their right to demand security from their
step-parent usufructuaries, not out of a genuine concern to protect their
patrimonies, but rather out of a desire simply to place a serious
financial burden on their step-parents, for the ultimate purpose of trying
to coerce their step-parents into releasing the usufruct (or, perhaps, for
some even more invidious purpose, such as sheer spite). It is not
57. See Step-Family Problems, in American Academy of Adolescent & Child
Psychiatry, Facts for Families, No. 27, at 1 (Nov. 1999) ("With the high incidence
of divorce and changing patterns of families in the United States, there are
increasing numbers of stepfamilies."). This publication is available at
http://www.aacap.org/publications/factsfam/stepfinly.htm (last visited May 14,
2003).
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difficult to imagine situations in which precisely this kind of thing
might happen and in which the resulting burden for the step-parent
would be more than she could bear.58
Though this objection is not without substance, the conclusion
in support of which those who make it argue-simply get rid of the
security requirement for the step-parental usufruct entirely--does
not follow from the premises. If one discovers that the established
remedy for a certain problem may itself cause problems, one should
not, without further analysis, leap to the conclusion that the remedy
should simply be eliminated: that would leave the original
problem-here, the risk of step-parental misconduct-unaddressed.
To the contrary, one should first consider whether the remedy can
be modified to avoid the problems it may cause and, if that is not
possible, one should then try to devise some other remedy. Only if
that, too, proves impossible should one consider eliminating the
remedy for the original problem. 9
In my judgment, this is a case in which the remedy can be
modified to avoid the problems it may cause. The solution lies in
altering the security requirement itself. One possibility is to accord
the judge discretion, when granting the step-children's request for
security, to choose some mode of security that might be less
burdensome for the step-parent than would traditional forms of
security. Indeed, during its past regular session, the Louisiana
Legislature clarified that the judge has discretion in this regard and
did so for precisely this reason.' If according the step-parent such
flexibility proves to be insufficient to avoid the problem, then other
possible solutions can be attempted. It might be appropriate, for
example, to require the step-children to prove, as a prerequisite to
receiving security, that there is reason to believe that the step-parent
will fail to perform her fiduciary duties towards them. Or, taking
a different tack, one might authorize the judge to adjust the amount
of security that the step-parent must post in proportion to the step-
parent's means6 and, in those extraordinary cases where the step-
58. Under present law, the usufructuary must, as a general rule, post security
in the amount of the value of the property to which the usufruct attaches. See La.
Civ. Code art. 572.
59. Even then, it would not follow, without further analysis, that the remedy
for the original problem should be done away with. That result would follow only
if one were to conclude that cost of the remedy (in terms of the problems it causes)
outweighs its benefit (in terms of the problems it solves).
60. This "clarification" is discussed elsewhere in this paper. See infra Part
I.B. 1. As I point out in that discussion, there is good reason to question whether
this "clarification" was even necessary.
61. Even under current law, the judge has discretion to reduce the amount of
security, "on proper showing," to a value less than that of the property to which
usufruct attaches. But he cannot reduce it below the value of the movables that are
2004]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
parent simply cannot afford to post security of any kind, even
dispense her from it completely.
These proposed solutions to the the problem of the risk to step-
parent usufructuaries posed by the traditional security requirement are
all more than plausible. Until they have been tried and found
wanting, there is no justification for eliminating the security
requirement entirely. To do that is to "throw the baby out with the
bathwater." And that, unfortunately, is precisely what the legislature
has done.
b. Legal Spousal Usufruct
1) When Security is Required
Whether, and if so, under what circumstances the naked owners
of property that is subject to a legal spousal usufruct can demand
security from the usufructuary is, at present, open to question. The
cause of the uncertainty is that there are no less than three distinct
pieces of legislation that seem to speak to the question, each of which
conveys a somewhat different message from those of the others. The
first is Civil Code art. 573, which provides as follows:
Art. 573. Dispensation of security
Security may be dispensed with by the grantor of
the usufruct or by operation of law. Legal
usufructuaries, and sellers or donors or property under
reservation of usufruct, are not required to give
security.
The second is the first sentence of Civil Code art. 1514, which reads
this way:
Art. 1514. Usufruct of surviving spouse affecting legitime;
security
A forced heir may request security when a
usufruct in favor of a surviving spouse affects his
legitime and he is not a child of the surviving spouse.
Finally, there is CCP art. 3154.1, which provides as follows:
Art. 3154.1. Request by naked owners other than children
of the marriage for security from surviving spouse
If the former community or separate property of a
decedent is burdened with a usufruct in favor of his
surviving spouse, successors to that property, other
among that property. See La. Civ. Code art. 572, par. 2.
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than children of the decedent's marriage with the
survivor, may request security in accordance with the
preceding Article in an amount determined by the
court as adequate to protect the petitioner's interest.
Though these three legislative provisions are not entirely
consistent, they are not entirely inconsistent either, that is to say, there
are at least some points of agreement among them. This agreement
can be described as follows: if the naked owners of the property to
which the legal spousal usufruct attaches are children of the
usufructuary, then the naked owners can not request security. The
disagreement among them, then, is confined to this question: whether
the naked owners of the property to which the legal spousal usufruct
attaches can request security if they are not children of the
usufructuary, in other words, if the naked owners and the usufructuary
are, as among themselves, step-children and step-parent. To this
question, the first Article-Article 573--dictates a negative answer;
the second-Article 1514-, a mixed answer, specifically, that the
naked owners can demand security only if(i) they are forced heirs and
(ii) the usufruct attaches to their forced portion; and the third
-Article 3154.1 -, an affirmative answer.
Of the three Articles in question, the first-Article 573-is, both
by virtue of its location within the code (Book II, Title... ) and its
content, the most "general" of the three: it states a "general rule" that,
in the absence of more specific legislation, purports to control all
legal usufructs, including (but not limited to) legal spousal
usufructs.62 The other two Articles are, at least by their terms, much
narrower: if they apply to legal usufructs at all (which, as we shall
see, is disputed), then they apply only to legal spousal usufructs.
Thus, the question, stated in abstract terms, is whether and if so to
what extent Article 1514 or Article 3154.1 might carve out an
"exception" to the more "general" rule of Article 573.
Regarding whether Article 1514 carves out such an exception, it
is difficult, at least at first glance, to see how anyone could possibly
have any doubts. By its terms, the Article appears to apply to all spousal
usufructs, for it makes no distinction as between those that are
testamentary and those that are legal. This impression is reinforced by
the comments to both this Article and Article 890-the Article that
establishes the legal spousal usufruct. According to comment (a) to
62. I keep using the word "general" in inverted commas because this
supposedly "general" rule is, itself, an "exception" to a still more "general" rule,
namely, that of La. Civ. Code art. 571 ("The usufructuary shall give security that
he will use the property subject to the usufruct as a prudent administrator and that
he will faithfully fulfill all the obligations imposed on him by law or by the act that
established the usufruct unless security is dispensed with.").
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Article 1514, "[t]he first sentence of this Article makes a limited
exception to the rule that a legal usufructuary is not required to give
security. See Civil Code Article 573." Comment (b) to Article 890 is to
the same effect:
Since this usufruct arises by operation of law, it is a legal
usufruct under C.C. Article 544. Although C.C. Article 573
provides that a legal usufructuary is not required to give security,
C.C. Article 1514, infra, provides an exception to that rule.
The text seems clear; the comments are certainly clear. On what
possible basis, then, might one question whether Article 1514 creates an
exception to Article 573?
The possible bases are two: the history of Article 1514 and the
position of Article 1514 within the Civil Code. The immediate source
of Article 1514 was the third paragraph of Article 890. That paragraph
applied both to true legal spousal usufructs, provision for which was then
made in the first paragraph of that Article, and to faux legal spousal
usufructs (testamentary usufructs that were said to have merely
"confirmed" the legal usufruct), provision for which was made in the last
phrase of the first paragraph and in the the second paragraph of that
Article. The revision of the law of spousal usufructs that took place in
1996, which (i) repealed, first, the last part of the first paragraph and the
entirety of the second paragraph of Article 890 and, second, the entirety
of the third paragraph of Article 890 and (ii) replaced them, respectively,
with new Article 1499 and new Article 1514, was intended to separate
out the parts of Article 890 that had concerned true legal spousal
usufructs from those that had concemedfaux legal spousal usufructs (in
fact, testamentary usufructs) 63 : those parts that had concerned true legal
usufructs were to "stay" (in Article 890, that is), whereas those that had
concerned testamentary usufructs were to "go." New Article 1514
"went": it is now situated elsewhere than in the Article that concerns true
legal spousal usufructs (Article 890); indeed, it is now situated in the
same part of the Civil Code to which Article 1499 was consigned (Book
III, Title HI, Chapter 3). For these reasons, it can be argued that Article
1514 applies only to testamentary spousal usufructs.'"
This argument, however, presumes an awful lot on the part of the
revisers of Article 1514. First, it presumes that the revisers, having
set themselves to the task of separating out the parts of Article 890
that pertain to legal spousal usufructs from those that pertain to
testamentary spousal usufructs, would have remained "on task"
63. This was, in fact, the point of the revision of La. Civ. Code art. 890 that
took place in 1996, at least if one can take the comments to that Article and to the
new Articles seriously.
64. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 26, § 194, at 400, Arruebarrena, supra note
31.
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throughout the revision. Second, it presumes that the revisers, if they
had deviated from their original plan and had decided, for some
unannounced reason, to remove from Article 890 a part of it that
nevertheless was to continue to remain applicable to legal usufructs,
would have situated the removed rule in the "right place" within the
Civil Code, that is, among other rules that are applicable to legal
usufructs or, at least, to legal spousal usufructs. The argument, in
short, presumes that the revisers were proficient in civilian
codificatory technique.
I am not sure that either of these presumptions is warranted. Here
is my guess (and it is only a guess) about what "went wrong" in the
thinking of the revisers. First, they decided, rightly and consistenly
with their original plan, to remove from old Article 890 the last part
of the first paragraph and the second paragraph, both of which, as we
have already seen, in fact concerned testamentary, not legal,
usufructs, relocating them in a new Article. This new Article
(numbered 1499) the revisers chose to locate in the part of the Civil
Code on "forced heirship" among the Articles that concern
impingements on the legitime, presumably because the new Article,
tracking the language of the second paragraph of old Article 890,
declares that a spousal usufruct does not constitute an impingement
on the legitime. Then, the revisers turned their attention to the third
paragraph of old Article 890. And here they encountered a little
problem: the rule set forth therein, as we have already seen, applied
to both legal and testamentary spousal usufructs. What were they to
do? If they left the paragraph alone, that would create the impression
that the rule applied only to legal spousal usufructs, but not to
testamentary spousal usufructs, an impression that would be
inaccurate. But if they simply moved the paragraph to Article 1499
along with the last part of the first paragraph and the second
paragraph of old Article 890, that would create the impression that the
rule applied only to testamentary spousal usufructs, but not to legal
spousal usufructs, an impression that, likewise, would be inaccurate.
At last a "solution," if one can call it that, suggested itself. First,
move the content of the third paragraph to a new, free-standing
Article, separate from both revised Article 890 and new Article 1499.
Second, why not situate this new Article among those that concern
impingements on the legitime-if that was "okay" for the new
incarnation of what used to be the last phrase of the first paragraph
and the second paragraph of old Article 890 (that is, new Article
1499), it ought to be "okay" for the that was good enough for the new
incarnation of what used to be the third paragraph of old Article 890
(that is, new Article 1514).
The revisers' "solution" can be faulted on at least two scores.
First, they did not, in fact, need to create a new free-standing Article
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in order to achieve their objective. It would have been sufficient if
they had simply left the third paragraph of old Article 890 where it
was (so that it would have become the new second paragraph of that
Article) and then "copied" that paragraph as a second paragraph of
Article 1499. That way, readers of revised Article 890 would have
recognized immediately that the rule still applied to legal spousal
usufructs (the subject matter of Article 890), as readers of new Article
1499 would have recognized immediately that the rule still applied to
testamentary spousal usufructs (the subject matter of new Article
1499). Second, they put their new Article in the wrong place.
Indeed, their placement decision would be humorous were it not for
the fact that the confusion it has caused is so serious. Now, it may be
that the "right place" for the contents of the last phrase of the first
paragraph and the second paragraph of old Article 890 was among the
Articles that concern impingements on the legitime, though even this
can be questioned. But the same cannot be said for the contents of
the third paragraph of old Article 890. Unlike the content of new
Article 1499, that of new Article 1514 has no direct connection with
the subject matter of impingements on the legitime; indeed, if the text
of Article 1499 is to be taken seriously, then testamentary usufructs,
at least, do not constitute such impingements. To the contrary, the
subject matter of new Article 1514 (at least as the revisers understood
it) is, quite simply, the security that is required for all spousal
usufructs, be they legal or testamentary. Given this understanding of
the subject matter of the new Article, the proper place for it was not
among the Articles on impingements on the legitime, a topic with
which the Article's contents had only a most tangential connection,
but rather among the Articles on usufructs in general, more precisely,
those that concern security for usufructs. 65
65. As this statement indicates, I do not assert that the content of new Article
1514 has no relation to the subject matter of impingements on the legitime; to the
contrary, there clearly is such a relation: by the terms of the Article, a naked owner can
obtain security only if and to the extent that the spousal usufruct attaches to his
"legitime." My contention, rather, is that the relation is incidental rather than
essential. As the law stands now, yes, the right of security moves in lockstep with the
right of forced heirship. But under the law in force between 1981 and 1996, as I
explained above (see infra pp.345-49) that was not true: the naked owner step-child
had a right to request security to the full extent of any property to which the usufruct
of his step-parent attached, even if that property exceeded his legitime. And it is
conceivable that, in the future, the law might be changed yet again so that the naked
owner step-child's right to security will no longer be racheted to his right to his
legitime. The point is this: the particular prerequisites for the right to demand
security, inasmuch as they can and do change, are not of the essence of the right to
security; they are, rather, "accidents" of that right. And in the civil law tradition, the
location of legal institutions within the framework of a civil code, like the arrangement
of that civil code itself, is supposed to be based on essence, not accidents.
352 [Vol. 64
J.-R. TRAHAN
Be that as it may, whatever one may say about the competence of
the revisers as practitioners of the art of condification, their objective
is not in doubt. As the comments to the Articles make clear, it was
their intention that the relocation of the content of the third paragraph
of old Article 890 to new Article 1514 not change the law of "security"
at all, in other words, it was their understanding that the new Article,
just like the third paragraph of old Article 890 before it, would apply to
both legal and testamentary usufructs. To be sure, the comments, as
some have pointed out,66 are not themselves true "sources of law." But
they are "authorities of law"67 -"doctrine," to be precise-and, for that
reason, may and, indeed, should be consulted for interpretive guidance.
Not only that, but these comments should carry particular weight in the
interpretive calculus: unlike some "official revision comments," they
were prepared in advance of the enactment of the new legislation and,
in addition, were included in the bill that was put before the legislators
for their approval.68 Under these circumstances, the comments of the
revisers provide a surer and more reliable guide to the "legislative
intent" behind new Article 1514 than does either the "history" of the
revision or the drafters' choice regarding the location of that Article.
That leaves Code of Civil Procedure Article 3154.1. Like Article
1514, this Article, by its terms, appears to apply to all spousal usufructs,
for it makes no distinction as between those that are testamentary and
those that are legal. Buttressing this impression is the history of this
Article. Article 3154.1 was enacted through Act No. 919 of the
Regular Session of 1981, an act that, among other things,
comprehensively revised the Articles of the Civil Code that pertain to
intestate successions. The preamble to the act, which singles out
Article 3154.1 for special mention, notes that its purpose is to
"provid[e] for the rights of certain naked owners of property burdened
with the surviving spouse's usufruct to request security"'69 without
further qualification.
66. Cf. Yiannopoulos, supra note 26, § 194, at 399 (brushing aside a comment
to Article 1499 in part on the ground that comments are "neither law nor source of
law").
67. See Frangois G6ny, Methode d'Interpretation et Sources en Droit Privg
Positif no. 138, at 303-05, no. 145, at 322-25, & no. 149, at 335-39 (Jaro Mayda
trans., La. Law Institute 1963).
68. See Chotin Transp., Inc. v. Harbor Towing & Fleeting, 804 So. 2d 78, 81
(La. App. 4th Cir. 2001) ("Revision comments do not form part of the law, but
when they are presented together with proposed legislation they illuminate the
understanding and intent of the legislators."); see also Wartelle v. Women's and
Children's Hosp., Inc., 704 So. 2d 778, 783 (La. 1997) (stating that because revision
comments had been "presented together with proposed legislation," they
"illuminate[d] the understanding and intent of the legislators").
69. See La. Acts No. 919 preamble (1981), reprinted in 2 Acts of the
Legislature (State of Louisiana) 2066 (1981).
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But Article 3154.1 is susceptible of another, much more narrow
(not to mention more curious), interpretation. The argument on which
this interpretation rests is known in the literature of juridical
methodology as argumentumpro subjecta materia, that is, an argument
from "subject matter."70 The "subject matter" of the Article, judged by
virtue of where the Article is situated within the scheme of the Code of
Civil Procedure, is that of the "security owed by the administrator of a
succession": the Article is the fifth (5th) of eleven (11) Articles in
Section 6 (entitled "Security, Oath, and Letters of Succession
Representative"), Chapter 1 (entitled "Qualification of Succession
Representatives"), Title 3 (entitled "Administration of Successions"),
of Book VI (entitled "Probate Procedure").71 If this is, indeed, the
subject matter of the Article, then the Article should operate only
within the context of the administration of a succession in which the
administrator is also a spousal usufructuary. For this reason, some have
suggested that the Article authorizes the naked owners to demand
security from the spousal usufructuary only if and for so long as the
succession out of which the usufruct was created (whether by the law
of intestacy or by testament) is under administration and, in addition,
only if the usufructuary and the administrator are one and the same.72
Of the two alternative interpretations of Article 3154.1 presented
above, the courts seem to prefer the former. Before Article 1514 was
created, that is, when the rules it contains were still situated in the final
paragraph of Article 890, the courts on a number of occasions applied
Article 3154.1 in tandum with the final paragraph of Article 890,
without, in so doing, suggesting that the two Articles differed in the
least, either in terms of their effect or in terms of their scope.73 And at
least two of these cases seem not to have involved administrations at
all.
To these cases one must now add Succession of Richaud.7' That
case involved the succession of a woman who, at her death, left behind
her second husband and three children by a prior marriage, none of
whom then qualified as a "forced heir." When the husband insisted that
he was entitled to a legal spousal usufruct on his deceased wife's one-
70. Kenneth Murchison & J.-R. Trahan, Western Legal Traditions & Systems:
Louisiana Impact 172 (2d ed. 2003).
71. See La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3151-59.
72. See 1 A.N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Code art. 1514, editor's note, at
p.3 0 1 (2004); Yiannopoulos, supra note 26, § 194, at 400.
73. Succession of Becker, 704 So. 2d 825 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1997);
Succession of Weidig, 690 So. 2d 134 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997); Morgan v. Leach,
680 So. 2d 1381 (La. App. I st Cir. 1996); Succession of Jones, 537 So. 2d 825 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1989); Succession of Watson, 517 So. 2d 276 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1987).
74. Weidig, 690 So. 2d 134; Morgan, 680 So. 2d 1381.
75. 835 So. 2d 653 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2002).
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half interest in the community, the children asked that he be required
to post security, a request to which the district court acceded. On
appeal, the husband challenged that determination. The court of
appeal, assuming for the sake of argument that the husband had, in fact,
acquired a legal spousal usufruct, turned back the challenge. The
court's rationale was predicated squarely and solely on Article 3154.1
of the Code of Civil Procedure:
If, as Mr. Richaud contended, he had a usufiuct over the
decedent's property, the heirs were entitled to obtain security
fiom him pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. Art. 3154.1.
Accordingly, we feel the heirs were entitled to this security
pending a judicial determination of whether the surviving
spouse was, in fact, entitled to a usufruct.7 6
Now, in this case, though there appears to have been an administration,
the administrator was not the step-parent-usufructuary (the surviving
husband), but rather was one of the step-children-naked owners.
Thus, of the two alternative interpretations of Article 3154.1 that
presented above, Richaud clearly confirms the former and contradicts
the latter.
2) Exclusion of the Usufruct Due to the Disposition of
Community Property by Testament
If a married person dies survived not only by his spouse but also by
at least one descendant, that spouse, according to Civil Code Article
890, receives a usufruct (a so-called legal spousal usufruct) over the de
cujus' one-half interest in the couple's community property "to the
extent that the decedent has not disposed of it by testament." Making
sense of the phrase "disposed of it by testament" has proven difficult."
One might be tempted to interpret the phrase literally. So
understood, the phrase would mean that the usufruct is excluded if and
to the extent that the testator-de cujus spouse makes a donation mortis
causa of his one-half interest in the community. It was in this fashion
that the Louisiana courts first interpreted the provision.78
76. Id. at 655.
77. Through the years a substantial amount of literature on this topic has
accumulated. See William H. Cook, Jr., Note, Donations-The Effect of a Will
upon the Legal Usufruct Created by Article 916of the Louisiana Civil Code, 18 La.
L. Rev. 574 (1958); Charles G. Gladney, Comment, The Usufruct of the Surviving
Spouse, 25 La. L. Rev. 873 (1965); Diane M. Lloyd, supra note 44; A.N.
Yiannopoulos, Of Legal Usufruct, the Surviving Spouse, and Article 890 of the
Louisiana Civil Code: Heyday for Estate Planning, 49 La. L. Rev. 803 (1989);
Frederick W. Swaim, Jr. & Kathryn V. Lorio, Successions & Donations § 2.16, at
53-55, in 10 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1995); Yiannopoulos, supra note 26.
78. See, e.g., Ludowig v. Weber, 35 La. Ann. 579 (1883); Succession of
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This literal interpretation, however, can lead to absurd results.
Suppose that the husband donates his one-half interest in the
community-the only property he has-to his wife, but that his
children-all of them forced heirs-reduce this donation to the
disposable portion. If one follows the literal interpretation, then one
would be forced to conclude that the wife would not be entitled to a
usufruct on the forced portion.79 That property, after all, had been
"disposed of by testament." But such a result makes little sense. If
the husband wanted to give his wife the full ownership of all of his
community property, then surely, if he had been told that he had to
leave part of that property to his children, he had have wanted to give
her "the next best thing," that is, a spousal usufruct over that part. 0
It was in part to avoid this kind of absurdity that another
interpretation was developed, one that might be called "functional."
According to this interpretation, a testator--deceased spouse
"disposes of it [his one-half interest in the community] by testament"
Schiller, 33 La. Ann. 1 (1881); Forstall v. Forstall, 28 La. Ann. 197 (1876);
Grayson v. Sanford, 12 La. Ann. 646 (1857). These early cases are sometimes cited
for the proposition that the deceased spouse has "disposed of' his "share of the
community property... by testament," thereby excluding the legal usufruct, any
time that he "made a testament." See, e.g., Cook, supra note 75, at 877. This
manner of describing the rule of those cases invites misunderstanding. Taken
literally, it would suggest that, as far as these courts were concerned, there would
be a testamentary disposition of community property, sufficient to exclude the
usufruct completely, if the testator spouse were to make a testament in which he
gave away (i) only his separate property or (ii) less than all of his community
property (as, for example, if a husband whose community property included a tract
of land, a house, a boat, and a car, were to make a testament that said only this: "I
leave my one-half interest in my boat to Ti-Boy"). These cases, however, say
nothing of the kind. In each of them, the testator spouse made a testament in which
he had purported to dispose of all of his community property. See Schiller, 33 La.
Ann. at I (the testament provided: "It is my will and desire that my estate be
distributed among my legal heirs, according to the laws now in force in Louisiana")(emphasis added); Forstall, 28 La. Ann. at 197 (the deceased "bequeath[ed] to her
[his wife] his share ofthe community property") (emphasis added); Grayson, 12 La.
Ann. at 646 (the testament provided: "I will and bequeath to my wife, Ann. L.
Sanford, the use of all my property, both personal and real, during her life.
However, if any of my children should sue for a partition during her life, I then will
and bequeath to her all of the property that I can dispose of by law, forever."). It
would be preferable, then, when stating the proposition for which these cases stand,
to do so as follows: the deceased spouse "dispose[s]" of his "share in the
community property . . . by testament," so as to exclude the legal usufruct
completely, whenever he purports to direct the distribution of the entirety of the
community portion of his estate by the terms of a testament. See Cook, supra note
75, at 575.
79. That, in fact, is precisely the result the court reached in the infamous case
of Forstall, 28 La. Ann. at 197.
80. See generally Swaim & Lorio, supra note 75, § 2.16, at 54; Gladney, supra
note 75, at 880.
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only when he makes a disposition of it that is "adverse to"
(incompatible with) the spousal usufruct.8s
This interpretation, however, has its own Achilles' heel, namely,
its indeterminancy. As Professors Swaim and Lorio, indulging in a bit
of understatement, have noted,
[t]he question then becomes one of determining whether the
will has indicated the testator's intent to deprive the spouse of
the usufruct. Has the testator intended something adverse to
the application of the usufruct? Interpreting wills to make
that determination is not an easy task."
Like every other determination of "intent," this one is of
necessity "fact intensive," that is, requires a discriminating
evaluation of each and every fact that might have any
tendency to illuminate what the testator was thinking and
wanted.
Employing this approach, the courts have, through the years,
identified a number of situations in which it is not appropriate to draw
an inference of "adverse disposition." Where the testator grants to his
surviving spouse precisely that to which she would have been entitled
by law, in other words, where he "merely confirms" the legal usufruct
by testament, there is no adverse disposition." The same is true
where the testator grants to his surviving spouse "more" than that to
which she would have been entitled by law, for example, full
ownership of his community property or full ownership of or a
usufruct over his entire estate. Where the testator disposes of less
than all of his community property, there is no adverse disposition
with respect to the rest of that property.
86
81. See Succession of Moore, 40 La. Ann. 531,4 So. 460 (1888); Succession
of Glancy, 108 La. 414, 32 So. 356 (1902); Winsberg v. Winsberg, 233 La. 67, 96
So. 2d 44 (1957); Succession of Waldron, 323 So. 2d 434 (La. 1975).
82. Swaim & Lorio, supra note 75, § 2.16, at 55; see also Lloyd, supra note 44,
at 1109 ("The unsolved question is what constitutes an adverse disposition.").
83. See generally Yiannopoulos, supra note 26, § 193, at 393; Yiannopoulos,
Heyday, supra note 75, at 815; Lloyd, supra note 44, at 1109-10.
84. See Grayson v. Sanford, 12 La. Ann. 646, 647 (1857); Fricke v. Stafford,
159 So. 2d 52 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963); see also Yiannopoulos, supra note 26, §
193, at 394 & 395, & § 196, at 406; Yiannopoulos, Heyday, supra note 75, at 816
& 825.
85. See Waldron, 323 So. 2d at 434; Winsberg, 233 La. at 67, 96 So. 2d at 44;
Moore, 40 La. Ann. at 531, 4 So. at 460; see also Yiannopoulos, supra note 26, §
193, at 394, & § 196, at 404, 405, 406; Yiannopoulos, Heyday, supra note 75, at
817, 817-18, 824 & 825; Lloyd, supra note 44, at 1106 & 1108.
86. See Glancy, 108 La. at 414, 32 So. at 356; see also Yiannopoulos, supra
note 26, § 192, at 392, & § 193, at 395; Yiannopoulos, Heyday, supra note 75, at
814-15 & 817.
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One interesting situation that the courts, until recently, had not
addressed was that in which the testator, without making any
reference to the spousal usufruct, simply disposes of all of his
property in favor of his descendants. Among the few scholars (only
three in all) who had addressed the question, there was disagreement
regarding whether such a disposition supports an inference of
"adverse disposition," two holding that it does,87 the other, that it does
not.88
Late last year, a Louisiana appellate court finally weighed in on
this question. The case was Succession of Richaud,8 part of which I
reviewed earlier. That case, it will be recalled, involved the
succession of a woman who had died survived by her second husband
and by three children of her first marriage, none of whom met the
definition of "forced heir." In her testament, the woman "bequeathed
the entirety of her estate and the residuary estate to her three
daughters." 90 The husband, as was noted earlier, contended that he
was entitled to a legal spousal usufruct over the woman's one-half
interest in the community property. The district court, finding that the
woman had "disposed of it [her share of the community property] by
testament," 91 rejected that contention. On appeal, the husband argued
that the district court had misapplied the "adverse disposition rule" in
making that ruling.92 The court of appeal disagreed. "[W]e believe,"
the court of appeal wrote, "that leaving one's entire estate to three
daughters certainly constitutes an 'adverse disposition'."93 For this
reason, the court of appeal affirmed the lower court's ruling "that the
surviving spouse is not entitled to a usufruct over the decedent's share
of the community property in this case and the heirs are entitled to a
87. Lloyd, supra note 44, at 1109; Cook, supra note 75, at 577.
88. Gladney, supra note 75, at 881.
89. 835 So. 2d 653 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2002).
90. Id. at 654.
91. La. Civ. Code art. 890.
92. The husband had an interesting "take" on the adverse-disposition rule.
According to him, "a testator must specifically state 'there is no usufruct' in the
will. Otherwise, ... the legal usufruct is confirmed by a testator's silence." 835 So.
2d at 655. The husband's position, then, was that there could be no "adverse
disposition" absent an express statement by the testator against the usufruct.
See Gladney, supra note 75, at 881 ("[T]he strong policy shown by the enactment
of Article 916 should dictate some clear indication by the testator that he does not
want the surviving spouse to have the usufruct before it will be denied.") To the
contrary, the jurisprudence and doctrine both have consistently stated, or at least
assumed, that an adverse disposition could be implied or tacit. See, e.g.,
Yiannopoulos, Heyday, supra note 75, at 816 ("Sometimes a testator's dispositions
implicitly indicate an intention to disclaim the surviving spouse usufruct.")
(emphasis added). Indeed, all of the major "adverse disposition" cases involve
instances of implied or tacit adverse disposition.
93. 835 So. 2d at 655.
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declaratoryjudgment to that effect."94 In reaching this conclusion, the
court of appeal, then, aligned itself with the "majority" position within
the doctrine.
C. Forced Heirship: "Permanently Incapable" Children: Expanded
Definition
Thanks to the "revision" of the law of forced heirship that took
place during the last decade, that law, which had theretofore served a
variety of purposes-from that of assuring the equitable distribution of
estates among descendants to conserving "family property"to deterring
the excessive accumulation of wealth9- now serves a different, much
more modest purpose, namely, to accord some measure of financial
support to those survivors of the de cujus who, due to their inability to
provide for themselves, stand most in need of it.96 That, at any rate, is
the conventional wisdom regarding the supposed end of the revised
law. But if one examines closely the provisions of this law that define
"forced heirs," in particular, Civil Code Article 1493, one soon
discovers that the "means" chosen for implementing this supposed
"end" are less than perfectly congruent with it. The trouble, in short,
is that the recognized categories of forced heirs, considered in relation
to this end, are, at once, too broad and too narrow. 97
Let us begin by considering the respects in which the categories are
too broad. It does not require much imagination to devise hypotheticals
that involve "forced heirs," as that term was defined in the revision,
who have no need of support whatsoever. Imagine, for example, a
child "under 24 years of age" who has this profile: at age 20, upon
being graduated summa cum lauda in engineering from MIT (to which
he had a full scholarship), he landed ajob with IBM paying $75,000 a
year; now, three years later, at age 23, he is an executive vice-president
with an BM competitor pulling down $125,000 a year. Such a person,
clearly, needs no support from his parents. Or imagine a "permanently
incapable" child who has this profile: at age 55, he was the head of a
multi-national corporation, which paid him a salary of $1,000,000 per
94. Id.
95. Succession of Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156, 1160 (La. 1993); see also Katherine
S. Spaht et al., The New Forced Heirship Legislation: A Regrettable "Revolution,"
50 La. L. Rev. 409, 416 (1990); Cynthia A. Samuel et al., Recent Developments in
the Law, 1983-84 - Successions and Donations, 45 La. L. Rev. 575, 591-95
(1984); Harriett S. Daggett, General Principles of Succession on Death in Civil
Law, 11 Tul. L. Rev. 399, 400-02 (1937).
96. Spaht, supra note 45, at 640-42 (2000); see also Cynthia Samuel, Letter
from Louisiana: An Obituary for Forced Heirship and a Birth Announcement for
Covenant Marriage, 12 Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F. 183 (1997) ("[F]orced heirship in
Louisiana now appears to partake as much of support as it does of inheritance.").
97. See generally Samuel, supra 93, at 183-84.
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year and he had a net worth of $250,000,000; at that time, he suffered
a spinal injury in a skiing accident that left him paralyzed from the neck
down. However sympathetic a figure this fellow may cut, one cannot
say that he "needs support."
Next, let us consider the respects in which the categories are too
narrow. Imagine, for example, a child who, just days before his
mother's death, turned 24 years of age, but who, thanks to his having
"dropped out" of college for what would have been his sophomore andjunior years in order to support and take care of his then ailing mother,
still had not finished his undergraduate education at the time of her
death. Surely this child stands in even greater need of support (and,
morally speaking, better merits receiving support) than would a 23 year
old who has already finished his undergraduate education or who,
though he has not finished, has no such laudable excuse for not having
done so. Or, again, imagine a mother with two children, both of whom
suffer from "Huntington disease," a genetic disorder with a progressive
pathology that inevitably produces, first, physical and mental disability
and, finally, death. Suppose that, by the time the mother dies, the older
child's disease has already reached the point at which he is
"permanently incapable" but that the younger child's has not, though
the younger child has already begun to show significant symptoms.
The younger child, it seems clear, will soon stand just as much in need
of support as does the older. To permit one but not the other to get that
support in the form of forced heirship rights smacks of arbitrariness.
This past summer the legislature took a small step toward
correcting at least one of these "incongruities" in the revised law of
forced heirship, namely, the last of those that I have just illustrated.
The legislators did this through the enactment of Act No. 1207, which
adds a new paragraph-denominated paragraph (E)--to Civil Code
Article 1493 (the Article that identifies forced heirs). The relationship
between the original Article and the amended Article is reflected in the
following chart:
Original Version Original Version Amended Version
with
Amendments
Art. 1493. Forced Ar t. 1 493. Art. 1493. Forced
h e i r s ; Forced heirs; h e i r s ;
representation of representation representation of
forced heirs of forced heirs forced heirs
A. Forced A. Forced A. Forced
heirs are heirs are heirs are
descendants of the descendants of descendants of the
first degree who, the first degree first degree who,
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at the time of the
death of the
decedent, are
twenty-three years
of age or younger
or descendants of
the first degree of
any age who,
because of mental
incapacity or
physical infirmity,
are permanently
incapable of
taking care of their
persons or
administering
their estates at the
time of the death
of the decedent.
B. When a
descendant of the
first degree
predeceases the
decedent,
representation
takes place for
purposes of forced
heirship only if the
descendant of the
first degree would
have been twenty-
three years of age
or younger at the
time of the
decedent's death.
C. However, when
a descendant of
the first degree
predeceases the
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who, at the time
of the death of
the decedent, are
twenty-three
years of age or
younger or
descendants of
the first degree of
any age who,
because of
mental incapacity
or physical
infirmity, are
permanently
incapable of
taking care of
their persons or
administering
their estates at the
time of the death
of the decedent.
B. When a
descendant of the
first degree
predeceases the
decedent,
representation
takes place for
purposes of
forced heirship
only if the
descendant of the
first degree
would have been
twenty-three
years of age or
younger at the
time of the
decedent's death.
C. However,
when a
descendant of the
first degree
at the time of the
death of the
decedent, are
twenty-three years
of age or younger
or descendants of
the first degree of
any age who,
because of mental
incapacity or
physical infirmity,
are permanently
incapable of
taking care of their
persons or
administering
their estates at the
time of the death
of the decedent.
B. When a
descendant of the
first degree
predeceases the
decedent,
representation
takes place for
purposes of forced
heirship only if the
descendant of the
first degree would
have been twenty-
three years of age
or younger at the
time of the
decedent's death.
C. However, when
a descendant of
the first degree
predeceases the
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decedent,
representation
takes place in
favor of any child
of the descendant
of the first degree,
if the child of the
descendant of the
first degree,
because of mental
incapacity or
physical infirmity,
is permanently
incapable of
taking care of his
or her person or
administering his
or her estate at the
time of the
decedent's death,
regardless of the
age of the
descendant of the
first degree at the
time of the
decedent's death.
D. For purposes of
this Article, a
person is twenty-
three years of age
or younger until he
attains the age of
twenty-four years.
predeceases the
decedent,
representation
takes place in
favor of any child
of the descendant
of the first
degree, if the
child of the
descendant of the
first degree,
because of
mental incapacity
or physical
infirmity, is
permanently
incapable of
taking care of his
or her person or
administering his
or her estate at
the time of the
decedent's death,
regardless of the
age of the
descendant of the
first degree at the
time of the
decedent's death.
D. For purposes
of this Article, a
person is twenty-
three years of age
or younger until
he attains the age
of twenty-four
years.
E. For purposes
of this Article
"1permanently
incapable of
taking care of
their persons or
decedent,
representation
takes place in
favor of any child
of the descendant
of the first degree,
if the child of the
descendant of the
first degree,
because of mental
incapacity or
physical infirmity,
is permanently
incapable of
taking care of his
or her person or
administering his
or her estate at the
time of the
decedent's death,
regardless of the
age of the
descendant of the
first degree at the
time of the
decedent's death.
D. For purposes of
this Article, a
person is twenty-
three years of age
or younger until he
attains the age of
twenty-four years.
E. For purposes of
this Article
"permanently
incapable of
taking care of their
persons or
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administering
their estates at the
time of the death
of the decedent"
shall include
descendants who.
at the time of
death of the
decedent, have,
according to
medical
documentation,
an inherited,
incurable disease
or condition that
may render them
incapable of
caring for their
persons or
administering
their estates in
the future.
This legislation has been widely criticized, sometimes
vociferously. To the extent that the critics have addressed themselves
to its merits98, they have faulted it on two related grounds: its scope,
they say, is (i) radically indeterminate and (ii) infinitely expandable.
98. In addition to attacking the legislation on the merits, many critics have
challenged its constitutionality, in particular, have argued that it violates Article 12,
§ 5 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, as amended in 1995. That section reads
as follows:
(A) The legislature shall provide by law for uniform procedures of
successions and for the rights of heirs or legatees and for testate and
intestate succession. Except as provided in Paragraph B of this Section,
forced heirship is abolished in this state.
(B) The legislature shall provide for the classification of descendants,
of the first degree, twenty-three years of age or younger as forced heirs.
The legislature may also classify as forced heirs descendants of any age
who, because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, are incapable of
taking care of their persons or administering their estates. The amount of
the forced portion reserved to heirs and the grounds for disinherison shall
also be provided by law. Trusts may be authorized by law and the forced
portion may be placed in trust.
La. Const. art. 12, § 5 (rev. 1995). Because I do not pretend to have any special
competence with respect to constitutional law, I will leave it to others who do to
respond to this argument.
administering
their estates at the
time of the death
of the decedent"
shall include
descendants who,
at the time of
death of the
decedent, have,
according to
medical
documentation, an
inherited,
incurable disease
or condition that
may render them
incapable of
caring for their
persons or
administering
their estates in the
future.
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the terminology in terms of which the legislation is cast, the meaning
of which, they contend, is supposedly novel, vague, and uncertain.
Second, considerable uncertainty supposedly surrounds several of the
key determinations that must be made under the legislation-first,
uncertainty regarding the time at which the presence or absence of the
attributes required of the new forced heirs is to be assessed and,
second, uncertainty regarding how and by what standard the presence
or absence of these attributes is to be proved. The "infinite
expandability" of the legislation, the critics charge, stems from the
use of the supposedly overly-expansive verb "may" as used in the
phrase "disease or condition.., that may render them incapable," the
effect of which may well be (so it is claimed) that "all persons are
now forced heirs." The end result of these deficiencies, the critics
maintain, is that the new legislation introduces a radical new
uncertainty into the question of "who is a forced heir," one that will
only serve to complicate both estate planning and the handling of
successions.
What I propose to do now is to try to answer these criticisms, to
the extent that that is possible. In offering this answer-which
amounts to a qualified defense of the new legislation-, I do not, by
any means, mean to suggest that this legislation is altogether free of
indeterminacy or "expandability" or other defects and in no way
complicates estate planning or the handling of successions. On the
contrary, it does, indeed, "muddy the waters" of forced heirship law
a bit and, as a result, unavoidably creates new difficulties for those
who plan estates and close successions. My argument, rather, is two-
fold. First, the indeterminacies in the legislation are not nearly so
great or the complications they will cause nearly so troublesome as
the critics suggest. That is true, at least, if the only "real" problem (I
will admit that there is only one) from which the legislation suffers is
promptly fixed. Second, in view of the good that this legislation
accomplishes, the cost of these complications is, all things
considered, a price worth paying. I will present these two arguments
seriatim below.
Having answered critics' charges, I will then offer a "friendly"
criticism of my own. My complaint, in short, is that the new
legislation does not expand the category of forced heir far enough.
1. My Defense of the New Legislation
a. The Charges Made Against the Legislation Are Exaggerated
The first point of my defense is that critics of the new legislation,
in their jeremiads against its supposed deficiences, have been guilty
of gross hyperbole. This is true not only of their complaints both
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about its supposed "indeterminacies," but also of their complaints
about its supposed "expandability." Let us begin by examining the
charge of indeterminacy.
The first targets at which the critics take aim are the terms
"inherited" and "incurable." According to the critics, these terms,
which they evidently regard as some sort of strange novelties, lack
any fixed meaning and, in fact, are susceptible of multiple
incompatible interpretations. I disagree.
Though the terms "inherited" and "incurable" are, indeed, "new"
to the law of forced heirship, they are hardly "new" to the law in
general. To the contrary, the terms appear-often in tandem-in the
legislation of all fifty states of the United States, as well as in that of
the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
Islands.99 In Louisiana alone, the term "inherited" appears in at least
99. The term "inherited," used as an adjective to such nouns as "disease,"
"disorder," "illness," or "characteristics," appears in Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 20-826,
20-1057,20-1342,20-1402,20-1404 & 20-2327 (2003); Ark. Code § 23-79-701
(2003); Cal. Gov't Code § 12926 (2003); Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 341, 412
& 125225 (2003); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 23-21-202 (2003); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§
19a-59a, 38a-494c & 38a-518c (2003); Fla. Stat. §§ 393.063, 400.960 &
627.42395 (2003); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 346-67, 378-1, 431:10A-118,
431:1OA-120, 431:1OA-404.5,432:1-607,432:1-609, 432:2-404.5 & 432D-26
(2003); 20 11. Comp. Stat. 2310/2310-378 & 2310/2310-405; 750 I11. Comp. Stat.
5/204 & 50/18. lb (form ?); Ind. Code §§ 16-38-4-1,27-8-24.1-1, 27-8-24.1-2,
27-8-24.1-3, 27-8-24.1-4, 27-8-24.1-5, 27-8-24.1-6 & 27-13-7-18 (2003);
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 213.141 & 304.17A-139 (Baldwin 2003); Md. Code, Health §
19-705.5, & Ins. § 15-807 (2003); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32A, § 17A; ch. 111, §
6D; ch. 175, § 471; ch. 176A, § 8L (2003); ch. 176B, § 4K; & ch. 176G, § 4D
(2003); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 191/320, 191.331 & 376.1219 (2003); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 71-645 (2003); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 689A.0423, 689B.0353, 695B.1923 &
695C.1723 (2003); N.H. Rev. Stat. §§ 415:6-c & 18-e; 420-A:17; & 420-B:8-ff
(2003); N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 17:48-6s, 48A-7q & 48E-35.16; 17B:26-2.1o,
27-46.lr, 27A-7.4 & 27A-19.6; 26:2J-4.17; & 52:14-17.29c (2003); N.Y. Dorn.
Rel. Law § 13-d (McKinney 2003); N.Y. Ins. Law § 3216, 3221,4303 (McKinney
2003); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2730 (McKinney 2003); N.D. Cent. Code §
26.1-36-09.7 & 54-52.1-04.11 (2003); 3 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 2303 (2003); Tex.
Health & Safety Code § 33.001 (Vernon 2003); Tex. Ins. Code §§ 1359.001 & art.
3.79 (Vernon 2003); Utah Code §31A-22-623 (2003); Vt. Stat. tit. 8, § 4089e
(2003); Wis. Stat. § 253.12 (2003).
The term "incurable," used as an adjective to such nouns as "disease," "illness,"
"condition," "insanity," or "person," or sometimes even as a substantive noun,
appears in Ala. Code § 34-24-166 (2003); Alaska Stat. §§ 18.12.010, 18.12.100
& 25.24.050 (Michie 2003); Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 23-1045, 32-394, 32-1501,
32-1854, 32-2233, 32-2501, 32-2933 & 36-3262 (2003); Ark. Code §§
9-12-301, 12-29-404, 17-95-409,20-17-201 & 20-17-202 (Michie 2003); Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code § 2241 (2003); Cal. Civ. Code § 2983.3 (2003); Cal. Fam. Code
§§ 2210, 2310, 2312, 2313, 2331, 2332, 4425, 4506 & 4510 (2003); Cal. Gov't
Code § 26859 (2003); Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 1368.1, 11217, 10144.1 &
4662 (2003); Cal. Penal Code §§ 667.71, 1170; Cal. Prob. Code §§ 2105, 4658 &
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one section of the Revised Statutesl °° and the term "incurable"
appears in no less than four sections of the Revised Statutes'0 ' and in
4701 (2003); Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 18836 (2003); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §
7288 (2003); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-32-107 & 15-18-103 (2003), Conn. Gen.
Stat. §§ 19a-570, 19a-575, 19a-575a, 31-307, 52-175, 52-191c & 53a-56 (2003);
3 Del. Code tit. x, § 7405; 9 Del. Code tit. x,. § 8106 (2003); 16 Del. Code fit. x§ 2505 (2003); 19 Del. Code fit. x § 2326 (2003); 24 Del. Code tit. x, § 711 (2003);
24 Del. Code tit. x, § 1731 (2003); D.C. Code §§ 4-1101, 7-621, 7-622, 7-651.01
& 24-461 (2003); Fla. Stat. §§ 61.061, 765.102 & 828.05 (2003); Ga. Code §§
19-5-3, 31-20-3, 31-32-2, 42-5-52 & 43-34-37 (2003); 10 Guam Code §
12209, 12820, 91102 & 91103; 19 Guam Code § 8101 (2003); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§
327E-1 6, 386-31, 436E-1 0, 442-9, 453-8, 455-11, 560-12, 461J-12 & 463E-6
(2003); Idaho Code §§ 32-501, 32-801, 39-4504, 54-1814, 56-1021, 66-405 &
72-407 (Michie 2003); 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 2310/2310-377; 225 Ill Comp. Stat.
60/53 & 75/19; 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 50/1; 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. 35/2, 35/3 & 40/10
(form ?); Ind. Code §§ 15-2.1-18.15, 16-36-4-10, 16-36-4-11, 31-15-1-2 &
35-15-2-3 (2003); Iowa Code §§ 144A.2, 144A.3, 153.32, 226.32 & 600.14
(2003); Kan. Stat. §§ 38-315, 44-510c, 65-2837 & 65-28,103 (2003); Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 311.595, 311.621, 342.0011, 615.040 (Banks-Baldwin 2003); Me.
Rev. Stat. tit. 18-A, § 5-801 & 5-804; fit. 22, § 2842; fit. 39-A, § 212 (2003); Md.
Code, Fain. Law § 7-103, & Health § 5-601 (2003); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, §
34A (2003); Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.361(2003); Minn. Stat. §§ 145B.02, 147.02,
518.06 & 609.215 (2003); Miss. Code §§ 21-29-147, 21-29-255, 41-41-209,
73-25-29, 73-27-13, 93-5-1 & 93-7-3 (2003); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 217.250 &
459.010 (2003); Mont. Code §§ 50-9-102, 50-9-103 & 81-2-201 (2003); Neb.
Rev. Stat. §§ 20-403, 20-404, 30-3402, 71-148, 71-501.01, 83-339 & 83-340
(2003); Nev. Rev. Stat. 127.040, 449.590, 449.610, 449.613, 449.830, 562.420,
616C.453, 630A.350, 634.018 & 638.1404 (2003); N.H. Rev. Stat. §§ 137-H:2 &
137-H:3 (2003); N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 36:2-23, 45:11-23 & 45:11-49 (2003); N.M.
Stat. §§ 24-7A-4 & 31-21-25.1 (Michie 2003); N.Y. Doam. Rel. Law §§ 140 &
141 (McKinney 2003); N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §§ 1676 & 1680 (McKinney 2003);
N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 3351 (McKinney 2003); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-5.1,90-321,
90-322 & 148-4 (2003); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 14-04-01,23-06.4-02, 23-06.4-03,
23-07-07,23-07-20,43-05-01 & 43-17-31 (2003); Ohio Rev. Code § § 1337.11,
1337.17, 2133.01,4730.25,4731.22,4741.22 & 4762.13 (2003); Okla. Stat. tit. 43,§ 101; tit. 59, §§ 509 & 698.14a; fit. 62, §§ 3080.2, 3101.3 & 3101.4 (2003); Or.
Rev. Stat. §§ 127.800, 677.188, 677.190, 684.100, 685.110 & 686.120 (2003); 20
Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 5403 & 54A03 (2003); Pa. Stat. tit. x, § 201-9.3 (2003); 11 P.R.
Laws § 3 & 31 P.R. Laws § 321 (2003); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 23-4-10-1.1,
23-4.11-2,23-4.11-3 & 28-33-17 (2003); S.C. Code §§ 44-77-20,44-78-15 &
62-5-504 (Law. Co-op. 2003); S.D. Codified Laws §§ 25-3-8, 25-4-18,
34-12D-1, 36-4-30, 40-5-9 & 43-31-24 (Michie 2003); Tenn. Code §§
62-4-127 (2003); Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 166.002 & 166.033 (Vernon
2003); Tex. Lab. Code § 408.161 (Vernon 2003); Utah Code § 30-3-1 & 58-28-2
(2003); Vt. Stat. fit. 15, § 551, 631,635; tit. 18, § 5252; & fit. 21, § 644 (2003); Va.
Code § 20-89.1 (Michie 2003); 19 V.I. Code §§ 186 & 187 (2003); Wash. Rev.
Code § 49.78.020, 70.122.020 & 70.122.030 (2003); W. Va. Code §§ 16-30-3,
30-16-11, 35-2-1, 35-2-4,48-3-103, 48-3-105 & 48-5-206 (2003); Wis. Stat.§ 50.94, 154.01 & 302.113 (2003); Wyo. Stat. §§ 11-19-106, 33-10-110,
33-26-402 & 35-22-102 (Michie 2003).
100. La. R.S. 22:215.22.
101. La. R.S. 37:1285 & 2816; La. R.S. 40:1299.58.3 & 49:1299.61.
one Article of the Children's Code.'12 The charge that these terms are
bizarre neologisms is, then, clearly false.
Likewise unpersuasive is the charge that these terms are so
indefinite that they could mean nearly anything. That these terms are
in such widespread use in legislation, though it provides no guarantee
that their meanings are "perfectly clear," does provide, at the very
least, some evidence that their meanings are not unworkably
amorphous. Indeed, one can not help but wonder why, if the terms
"inherited" and "incurable" are as nebulous as the critics insist-so
nebulous that they cannot help but invite endless litigation regarding
their meanings-, so many legislators in so many places have chosen
to use them not just once, but again and again.
Be that as it may, the very way in which these terms are used in
this legislation itself suggests that their meanings are, in fact, quite
clear. In not one of these pieces of legislation did the legislators find
it necessary to offer up a definition for either of those terms; to the
contrary, in many of those pieces of legislation the legislators used
those terms to define other terms. This shows that, at least in the
judgment of these legislators, the meanings of those terms is so clear
as to be self-evident.
This judgment, by the way, is entirely sound: no one who bothers
to consult either a common dictionary or a dictionary of medical
terms could possibly doubt it. No matter which dictionary one may
happen to consult, one finds the same simple definitions repeated
over and over. The term "inherited" means "genetically transmitted
from one generation to the next.""1 3 The term "incurable" means "not
capable of being cured,'1 " and "cure," in turn, means "restoration to
health" or "recovery from an illness.' 05
"But," the critics of the new legislation retort, "it is unclear
whether the determination of'inheritedness' is to be made generically
or individually." As the critics correctly note, some diseases, though
they are normally contracted by genetic transmission, can in certain
unusual cases have some non-genetic cause, for example, infection or
injury.0 6 Such a disease, the critics contend, might well be
considered "inherited" not in the sense of "always and only inherited"
102. La. Ch. C. art. 1557.
103. Churchill's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 944 (1989) ("inherited").
104. Churchill's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 933 (1989) ("incurable");
Blackiston's Gould Medical Dictionary 669 (4th ed. 1979) ("incurable");
105. Churchhill's Medical Dictionary 454 ("cure"); Gould Medical Dictionary
343 ("cure").
106. This is true, for example, of certain types of cancer: though in the typical
case the cause is (in whole or in part) "genetic," in some cases the cause may be a
virus, a physical agent (e.g., radiation), or a chemical (i.e., "carcinogens"). See
Lawyers' Medical Cyclopedia §§ 38.6-38.1Oc (Charles J. Frankel et al. eds., 3d ed.
1984).
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but rather in the sense of "usually inherited." And so, the critics ask,
"What is one to say of a person who suffers from a disease that,
though normally contracted genetically, he did not in fact inherit, that
is, that he contracted through some other cause? Does he have an
'inherited disease'?"
This objection fails. Had the legislators intended that the
determination of "inheritedness" be made on the basis of the
characteristics typical of the disease, without regard to whether, in
any given case, the disease of the particular purported forced heir had,
in fact, been inherited, then they would have used the term
"inheritable"--meaning that which can be, but need not necessarily
be, inherited-not the term "inherited."
"But," the critics of the new legislation protest, "it is unclear
whether a disease should be considered 'incurable' if, though its root
cause cannot be eliminated, its symptoms can be controlled or perhaps
even erased through effective 'treatment'." As a result, the objection
continues, it is unclear whether a person who suffers from some
disease, that, though ineradicable in terms of its causes, can be
successfully treated if and when its symptoms finally manifest
themselves, can claim "forced heir" status under the new law.
This objection, too, is without substance. In medical writing on
the topic of "inherited, incurable diseases" (which is abundant),
authors not uncommonly note that many diseases, though "incurable,"
are nonetheless "treatable." Consider, for example, the following
excerpt from the Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy, a standard
medical reference work: "A common misconception is that some
cancers are untreatable. Although the cancer may be incurable, the
patient can be treated."' ° Here is another example, this one taken
from the Lawyers' Medical Cyclopedia: "A recently developed drug,
acyclovir (Zovirax) is now the treatment of choice [for herpes
simplex type nI] . . . . It reduces the number of infectious virus
pArticles and the time required for an active infection to clear, but it
does not cure the patient." '' Finally, there is this example from the
Attorneys' Textbook of Medicine: "Diabetes mellitus has no known
cure, but its effective treatment can extend the patient's life and
increase his comfort."'0 9 Underlying these statements (as well as
countless others I could provide) is the notion that insofar as a disease
or medical condition is concerned, "cure" is one thing and "treat"
another, specifically, that "cure" means to eliminate the root cause of
107. The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy § 11, ch. 144 (17th ed.
2003).
108. 1 Lawyers' Medical Cyclopedia of Personal Injuries and Allied Specialties
§ 7.19, at 151 (James G. Zimmerly & Richard M. Patterson eds., Supp. 1992).
109. 3A Roscoe N. Gray & Louise J. Gordy, Attorneys' Textbook of Medicine
74.71, at 74-34 (Lois L. Caswell et al. eds., 3d ed. 1991).
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the disease or condition, so that its symptoms cease to recur, whereas
"treat" means merely to control, suppress, or alleviate the symptoms,
which will recur if and when the treatment ceases. It seems
reasonable to assume that the legislature, in drafting Article 1493(E),
did so with this very commonly-recognized distinction in mind.
Because that is so, it is reasonable to conclude that the expression
"incurable disease," as used in that paragraph, includes diseases that
are "treatable." If the legislature had intended to exclude "treatable"
diseases from the scope of the paragraph, it could and undoubtedly
would have said so, that is, added the word "untreatable" after the
word "incurable."
To this answer to their objection, the critics have something of a
rebuttal (or so they think). "If one who suffers from an 'inherited,
incurable' but 'treatable' disease that 'may,' in the future, 'render
[him] incapable of caring' for himself or his property, at least if his
disease is not 'treated,' qualifies as a forced heir, then what is to
prevent him from forgoing treatment for the very purpose of assuring
that he will end up being 'incapable' and, on that basis, will qualify
as a forced heir? Would not such conduct constitute a 'fraud on the
law'?"
The rebuttal is not convincing. The truth is that to the extent that
this objection identifies a real problem,"' it is not "new": it was
present under the original law as well. Roll back the clock to one
year ago, before the enactment of the new paragraph, and consider
this example. There is a person who, at the time of his parent's death,
suffers from an already full-blown case of severe bi-polar disorder.
If he takes his lithium (that is, submits to "treatment"), which (we
will suppose) he can afford to do financially and presents no
significant adverse health risks to him, he can lead a normal life. But
if he does not, he quickly loses his bearings to the point that he can
not care for his person or his property. One could well have asked,
"Is such a person 'permanently incapable' or not?" And the answer
to the question would not have been clear, for the old law did not
specify whether and, if so, under what circumstances, one should, in
assessing someone's "permanent incapacity," take the "treatability"
of his disease or condition into account."' Thus, the "problem" that
110. The probability that a person would, by willingly forgoing affordable and
safe treatment, allow himself to become "permanently disabled" in order to qualify
as a forced heir is remote. Except in the most extraordinary circumstances, a
rational person would find the "cost" of this "benefit" just "too high."
111. For what it is worth, my own opinion on this question of the "old law" is
that a person who suffers from some "treatable" condition that, if left untreated,
would render him "permanently incapable" of caring for himself or his property
should nevertheless not be regarded as "permanently incapable" and, therefore,
should not qualify as a forced heir if (i) he can afford to pay for the treatment
2004]
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the critics have identified is one that plagued the old law no less than
the new. Not only that, but whatever solution one might work out for
the problem under the old law would work just as well as a solution
for the problem under the new law. Suppose we said that our
hypothetical sufferer from bi-polar disorder would not qualify as a
forced heir under the old law, on the theory that, inasmuch as his
condition was safely and affordably treatable (by lithium ingestion),
he could not be regarded as now "permanently incapable." By the
same token, then, one who, at the time of the de cujus 'death, had just
begun to show the symptoms of bi-polar disorder, but had not yet
developed a full-blown case of it, but who, if he should later develop
a full-blown case of it, could afford to undergo the same treatment
(lithium ingestion) without significant risk, would not qualify as a
forced heir either, for it could not be said of him that he suffers from
a disease or condition that "may render him permanently incapable"
in the future. As a matter of standard English usage, it can be said
that some cause "may render" a person into some state or condition
(we will call it A) in the future only if it is possible that this person
might, as a result of that cause, "become A" in the future. Now, for
any thing X to "become A," it must be the case that, at some point in
the future, it will be possible to say that X "is now A." Here in our
case, there is no such possibility: if we deny the title "permanently
incapable" to a person who now suffers from some disease whose
symptoms, at present, are such that they would render him
"permanently incapable" were his disease not treated, but whose
disease can now be safely and affordably treated, then with respect to
a person who suffers from a disease whose symptoms can be safely
and affordably treated if and when they eventually present themselves
(X), there will not and cannot ever come a time at which it would be
appropriate to say of him, "He is now permanently incapable."
In addition to the "indeterminacy" criticisms I havejust reviewed,
which are focused on the terminology of the new legislation, the
critics, as I noted earlier, add several others that, for convenience of
exposition, can be collected under two headings. Some of the
complaints concern the supposed indeterminacy of the "burden of
proof' that is to govern the determinations that must be made under
the new legislation, for example, that of whether the supposed forced
without experiencing financial hardship and (ii) the treatment is one that a
"reasonable" person who suffers from that condition would agree to undergo. I
base this opinion on my appreciation of the purpose of the "revised" law of forced
heirship, which, as we have seen, is to provide a modicum of financial support for
the de cujus' economically vulnerable descendants. See La. Civ. Code art. 10. That
purpose would be defeated if one were to exclude from the class of "forced heirs"
those who can avoid "permanent incapacity" only by incurring substantial costs or
taking inordinate risks.
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heir in fact has some disease or condition or that of whether this
disease or condition is, in fact, inherited and incurable.
That takes care of the "indeterminacy" objections; now let us deal
with the "infinite expandability" objection. This criticism, as I noted
earlier, is focused on the verb "may" as it is used in the phrase
"disease or condition that may render them incapable . . . in the
future." The word "may," so say the critics, is a sign for "mere
contingency": it can be said that a certain thing "may" happen so long
as there is "any possibility" at all, no matter how remote it maybe, of
this thing's occurring. According to the critics, there are few, if any,
diseases or conditions of which it could not be said that there is at
least "some chance" that it might, in the future, cause the person who
suffers from it to become permanently incapable, even if the chance
is infinitesimal (say, 1/1,000,000). As one lawyer in New Orleans is
reported to have quipped, "Heck, every single lawyer in my office has
some medical problem that may render him incapable in the future."
And so, the critics charge, the new legislation, acting through the
"back door" as it were, comes close to reproducing the "old" law of
forced heirship, that under which all descendants of the de cujus
qualified as forced heirs.
This argument rests on a mistaken assumption, namely, that the
term "may" is univocal, that is, has one and only one possible
meaning-mere contingency. A moment's reflection on how the
term "may" is used in everyday speech points at the mistake.
Suppose that one day I notice that my daughter, who is heading out
to play on a sunny day, is taking an umbrella with her. Puzzled, I ask,
"What's up with the umbrella?" In reply she says, "Well, the other
day, as I left to go out to play, Mom told me that I should take my
umbrella with me 'because it may rain today.' And so, this morning,
I checked the Weather Channel to see if it 'may rain' today.
According to the forecast, there's a 5% chance of rain today. So, I'm
taking my umbrella with me." At this point, I would be entitled, I
think, to conclude that she does not understand what the term "may"
as it is used in the phrase "because it may rain" really means (or,
perhaps, that she is a bit daft). Here, in this context, the term "may"
points not to mere contingency, but to significant contingency. Thus,
"may" does not always mean "if there is any possibility, no matter
how remote it may be"; to the contrary, sometimes it means "if there
is a significant possibility."
Now, as the term "may" is used in Article 1493(E), it has this
latter, more restricted, sense. That this is (and must be) so becomes
clear when one interprets the Article "teleologically," that is, in the
light of its purpose (telos),"' and in a way that pays proper respect to
112. La. Civ. Code art. 10; see also Kenneth Murchison & J.-R. Trahan,
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the principle that interpretations which lead to "absurd consequences"
ought to be resisted.' 3 The purpose of the legislation was not, of
course, to re-create the "old" law of forced heirship, but rather was,
as I have already explained, to extend the "support" benefits of the
new law of forced heirship to yet another group of economically
vulnerable successors, namely, those who, though still in good health
and still fully capable of caring for themselves and their property at
the time of the de cujus' death, will later lose that capability due to
some inherited, incurable disease. If the term "may" as used in the
new legislation were to be interpreted as a sign for mere possibility,
then the legislation in all likelihood would end up forcing property
distributions in countless situations in which, at the end of the day,
the possible "permanent incapacity" would never in fact materialize.
Imagine a certain inherited, incurable disease X that has a 1%
probability of at some point reducing its victim to "permanent
incapacity." If everyone who suffers from this disease were entitled
to claim forced heirship status (and did so), then the "final outcome"
of the legislation, with respect to these persons, would be this: out of
every one hundred of them, ninety-nine would have received forced
shares of estate property that they never, in fact, "needed." In these
ninety-nine cases, of course, the purpose behind the new legislation
would not have been furthered at all. The drafters of the legislation
could not possibly have intended such an outcome, that is, one in
which the final results are so far out of line with the objective sought.
Indeed, one might even, with some justification, speak of such an
outcome as absurd. The only way to avoid this absurd result, of
course, is to read the legislation in such a way that it will produce a
tighter "fit" between final results and objective sought. And the only
way to do that is to interpret the word "may" in such a way that it
refers to some probability that is more substantial than mere
contingency. In short, given the purpose of the new legislation, it
would be absurd to interpret the term "may" so expansively that it
means "any possibility at all, no matter how remote"; rather, it must
be interpreted to mean something like "a significant possibility."
b. The Good that the Legislation Accomplishes is Worth its
Cost
The second point of my defense is that any increased
indeterminacy or uncertainty that the new legislation may have
injected into the law of forced heirship is "worth it." It must not be
Western Legal Traditions & Systems: Louisiana Impact 176, 178 (2d ed. 2003).
113. La. Civ. Code art. 9; see also Kenneth Murchison & J.-R. Trahan, Western
Legal Traditions & Systems: Louisiana Impact 171-72 (2d ed. 2003).
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forgotten that "freedom of testation" and "ease of application of
law" and "efficient administration ofjustice"--the very values that
the critics of the new legislation believe it threatens-are by no
means the only values that are at stake in this affair. Alongside
these, there is at least one other: it is, if I may borrow a phrase from
St. James, "to look after orphans ... in their distress."' 4 The very
purpose of this new legislation, it must be recalled, is to bring under
the protective umbrella of the law of forced heirship yet another
group of "vulnerable" successors of the de cujus - a group that,
improvidently and unjustifiably in my judgment, was not covered
by the law of forced heirship as it was originally revised-namely,
those who, though not yet in fact "permanently incapable" at the
time of the de cujus'death, stand a reasonable chance of becoming
so thereafter. To do this not only is consistent with the purported
purpose of the revised law of forced heirship; it is also highly
desirable in itself, both as a matter of political economy and as a
matter of ethics. In my judgment, the goods achieved by this new
legislation-bringing the letter of the law into closer alignment with
its spirit; protecting the public fisc; and, most important of all,
enhancing the morality of our law-are worth the "costs." Though
this maybe ajudgment with which reasonable persons can disagree,
it is not, as some of the critics of the legislation have asserted,
unreasonable."' 116
114. James 1:27 (RSV).
115. I suspect that the critics of the new legislation, most of whom are practicing
attorneys who do "successions work," will scoff at this proposition. "This," they
may well say, "is an opinion only an 'academic' - one cloistered away in his ivory
tower, far removed from the 'reality' of legal practice - could hold. If he ever had
to deal with a succession in which the new legislation was implicated, he'd feel
differently."
When it comes to assessing the costs of the new legislation, then, the
"practitioners" do have an advantage over the "academics."
But there's more to evaluating legislation than just assessing its costs: one must
also assess the good that it will accomplish. And it is with respect to this other
evaluation that the practitioner may well be at a disadvantage. The practitioner, of
course, invariably-and quite properly-identifies with his clients (that's his job):
their needs and wants are his needs and wants; what frustrates them frustrates him;
what pleases them pleases him. Now, when it comes to "successions attorneys,"
few there be who've built their careers representing "forced heirs." No, their clients
are (i) persons who want to plan their estates and /or (ii) beneficiaries of those
plans. And it is these persons, of course, who will, in the course of time, find the
new legislation to be a source of irritation, for it will, as we've seen, make the
planning of estates and the execution of estate plans (incrementally) less certain. Is
it at least possible that many "successions attorneys," by virtue of their close
identification with clients such as these, may have difficulty arriving at an
"objective" assessment of the good that the new legislation will
accomplish-something that their clients do not themselves personally
experience-or of making an "objective" judgment about whether that good
2004] 373
374 LOUISIANA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 64
outweighs the costs of the new legislation-something that their clients do
personally experience?
What prompts me to ask this admittedly presumptuous question is my own
experience as a practicing lawyer. When I was in practice, where I did a
tremendous amount of "environmental law" work-most of it for major industrial
clients-, I had little, if anything, good to say about environmental legislation or
regulations, be it or they federal or state. The legislation and regulations all struck
me as poorly written, in no small measure because they were, at many points,
irritatingly "indeterminate" (or so it seemed to me then). Not only that, but the
good that many of the statutes or regulations were supposed to achieve struck me
as obscure or speculative or both, while the costs (including frustration of well-laid,
investment-backed industrial expansion plans) were ever before me. Now, some
eight years out of practice, I perceive things a bit differently. From my vantage
point here in the "ivory tower," I can now see, much more clearly than I ever could
before, the interests of those to whom the interests of my former clients were
opposed as well as the value of giving at least some measure of protection to those
interests, even if it be at the expense of the interests of my former clients.
Just as it's possible to be "too far" from a situation to understand it properly, it's
also possible to be "too close" to a situation to get a proper perspective on it.
116. Rumor has it that the enemies of forced heirship, who are greatly piqued at
the enactment of Act 1207, have decided to retaliate thereto by seeking an
amendment to the state constitution that would abolish forced heirship entirely.
Such an extreme measure is called for, they say, because without it the friends of
forced heirship will never stop trying to secure the enactment of legislation like Act
1207 and, from time to time, will even succeed.
This plan, if it in fact exists, can be faulted on two scores. (i) First, the plan is
directed against a phantom. The chance that another piece of legislation like Act
1207 will ever again be enacted is slight indeed. That is so for two reasons. (a) For
one thing, this act, constitutionally speaking, "pushes the envelope" about as far as
it can possibly go. Of all the items on the "wish list" of the friends of forced
heirship-a list that includes extending coverage to incapable ascendants and
siblings, just to mention a few- that which is instantiated in Act 1207-extending
coverage to future incapables-is the only one that is even arguably constitutional.
Any attempt to extend coverage to other persons, for example, incapable
ascendants, would be so patently unconstitutional that no one in his right mind
would ever try it. (3) For another thing, the enactment of Act 1207 was made
possible only by a temporary alignment of political interests that is about as likely
to be repeated as it is likely that lightning will strike the same place twice. (ii)
Second, the plan is socially irresponsible. Unlike the "old" law of forced heirship,
the "new" provides special inheritance rights only to those descendants of the de
cujus who are the most economically vulnerable-those who are too young or too
incapacitated to be self-supportive. If anyone "deserves" post mortem financial
support, these people do, something that even the freedom-of-testation-obsessed
"common law" states, some of which have now set up schemes for post mortem
financial support, have finally begun to recognize. See generally Christina Donato
Saler, Comment, Pennsylvania Law Should No Longer Allow a Parent's Right to
Testamentary Freedom to Outweigh the Dependent Child's "Absolute Right to
Child Support, "34 Rutgers L.J. 235 (2002). To abolish the law of forced heirship
without instituting some other means of meeting the needs of these "orphans" and
"handicapped persons" is an act so callous that it would make even Satan's courtiers
wince.
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2. My "Friendly" Criticism of the New Legislation
Though the criticisms that the opponents of Article 1493(E) have
directed against it prove, upon close analysis, to be unfounded, the
legislation is not, in my judgment, entirely above criticism. To the
contrary, it is seems to me that the legislation is open to at least one
major criticism, one that the "unfriendly" critics of the legislation
would never themselves even be able to see, much less be willing to
voice: the legislation is too narrow, arbitrarily so. As it is written, the
legislation limits its benefits to those "future incapables" whose future
incapacity stems from some disease or condition that is "inherited." It
would be better-more consistent with the purpose of the
legislation-to extends these benefits to all future incapables,
regardless of what may be the cause of the future incapacity. Imagine
a child of the de cujus who, at the time of the de cujus' death, suffers
from asbestosis, which he contracted as a result of his exposure to
asbestos in the workplace. If this person's condition deteriorates to the
point at which he can no longer care for himself, will he not stand as
much in need of assistance as would a child who, at the time of the de
cujus' death, suffered from some degenerative condition that he had
inherited? My point is this: given the purpose of the new legislation,
which is to accord the advantages of forced heirship to those who,
though not yet incapable of caring for themselves when their ancestors
die, are likely to become so incapacitated in the course of time, what
matters is not why they will become incapable, but rather and only that
they will become incapable. For these reasons, I would recommend
that the word "inherited" be removed from the legislation.
II. DONATIONS
A. Capacity to Donate: Interdiction & Inability to Understand
Art. 395. Capacity
to make juridical
acts
A full interdict
lacks the capacity to
make ajuridical act,
except as otherwise
provided by law. A
limited interdict
retains the capacity
to make a juridical
act, except as
otherwise provided
Art. 395. Capacity
to make juridical
acts
A full interdict
lacks the-capacity to
make ajuridical act;
provided-by-la. A
limited interdict
retains-the--lacks
capacity to make a
juridical act
pertaining to the
Art. 395. Capacity
to make juridical
acts
A full interdict
lacks the-capacity to
make ajuridical act.
A limited interdict
lacks capacity to
make a juridical act
pertaining to the
property or aspects
of personal care that
the judgment of
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by law or the
judgment of limited
interdiction. A
judgment of
interdiction does
not remove the
capacity of the
interdict to make or
revoke a disposition
mortis causa,
except as otherwise
provided by law,
but it does remove
the capacity of the
interdict to make a
donation inter
vivos.
Art. 1482. Proof of
incapacity to
donate
A person who
challenges the
capacity of a donor
must prove by clear
and convincing
evidence that the
donor lacked
capacity at the time
the donor made the
donation inter vivos
or executed the
testament.
However, if the
donor made the
property or aspects
of personal care
that the judgment of
limited interdiction
places under the
authority of his
curator, except as
provided in Article
1482-xeept--as
by-law-or in the
judgment of limited
interdiction. *
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Art: 1482. Proof of
incapacity t o
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presumptions may presumptions may
be rebutted by a be rebutted by a
preponderance of preponderance of
the evidence. the evidence.
To understand the new legislation, one must first understand the
old. It was in large part to eliminate certain perceived deficiencies in
the old that the new was enacted.
The edifice of "old law," that is, the law as it stood prior to the
amendment, was constructed in two phases. The first phase,
completed in 1991, was part of a substantial Civil Code revision
project, one that covered all of Chapter 2, Title II, Book III of the
Civil Code, a chapter entitled "Of the Capacity Necessary for
Disposing and Receiving by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa."
The second phase, completed in 2000, was part of yet another
substantial Civil Code revision project, this one of Title IX, Book I of
the Civil Code, a title entitled "Of Persons Incapable of
Administering their Estates, Whether on Account of their Insanity or
Some Other Infirmity, and of Their Interdiction and Curatorship."
Let us begin by looking at "phase 1." Its contribution to the "old
law" consisted of two Articles-Article 1477 and Article 1482. The
former (1477) described the basic mental capacity necessary for a
donor, namely, that one must "be able to comprehend generally the
nature and consequences of the disposition." This Article made no
mention of interdiction. That topic was left to the latter Article
(1482). Under that Article, a judgment of interdiction 1 7 did not, in
itself, strip the interdict of capacity to donate, be it inter vivos or
mortis causa (in other words, interdiction produced no per se
incapacity). Instead, the interdict was merely presumed to lack the
basic mental capacity required of a donor, as that capacity was
described in Article 1477, so that, if a donation made by an interdict
were challenged under that other Article, then the proponent of the
donation would bear the burden of proving that the interdict,
notwithstanding his interdiction, nevertheless had this basic mental
capacity.
Though the legislation enacted in "phase 1" was, relatively
speaking, free of serious technical problems, one aspect of it did
strike many (myself included) as curious, at least as a matter of
policy. This "curiosity" was that the legislation did not create aper
se incapacity for the interdict. Such a result seemed anomalous in
117. When Article 1482 was enacted, the law of interdiction did not distinguish
judgments of interdiction into various grades, such as "full" and "limited." This
distinction would not be injected into that law until the year 2000. See La. Civ.
Code arts. 389 & 390 (rev. 2000).
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the light of the kind of "competency" finding that a judgment of
interdiction necessarily entailed and in the light of the other, non-
donative capacity effects that such a judgment produced. In order
to obtain a judgment of interdiction under the law that was then in
force, the petitioner had to prove that the target of the interdiction
action was "subject to an habitual state of imbecility, insanity or
madness.""..8 Thus, what the new legislation on donative capacity
did was to accord this capacity to persons who had been adjuged
"habitually mad." And that is strange, indeed, especially when one
considers that, under the law that was then in force, such a person
suffered from a per se incapacity to transfer his property
onerously." 9 Now, which kind of transfer poses a greater threat to
the interdict: one by gratuitous title or one by onerous title?
Next, let us consider the second phase. Its contribution to the
"old law" consisted of one Article-Article 395, entitled "Capacity
[of interdicts] to make juridical acts." This Article, first of all, set
out a rule regarding the effects of a judgment of interdiction upon
the capacity of an interdict to make juridical acts in general, a rule
that distinguished "full" and "limited" interdicts. According to the
Article, whereas the former lacked capacity to make juridical acts
(except as otherwise provided by law), the latter retained that
capacity (except as otherwise provided by law). The term "juridical
act,"which refers to any act of will that is aimed at producing the
very legal consequences that, by law, are attached to such an act, 20
was certainly broad enough to include donations. After this general
rule, the Article next laid down a special rule for capacity to make
donations. According to the Article, whereas a "judgment of
interdiction" did not deprive the interdict of the capacity to make a
donation mortis causa, it did deprive him of the capacity to make a
donation inter vivos.
The completion of this second phase of the "construction" of the
"old law," obviously enough, created a few problems. The first
problem was "internal" to article 395 itself. And the problem was
this: it was not at all clear whether the term "interdiction," as used
in the special rule laid down for donative capacity, referred to "full"
interdiction, to "limited" interdiction, or to both. The second, and
118. La. Civ. Code art. 389 (1870).
119. La. Civ. Code art. 1918.
120. Kenneth Murchison & J.-R. Trahan, Western Legal Traditions & Systems:
Louisiana Impact 554, 561-63 (2d ed. 2003); A.N. Yiannopoulos, Civil Law
System: Louisiana & Comparative Law § 236, at 447 (2d ed. 1999); Sail Litvinoff
& W. Thomas Tete, Louisiana Legal Transactions: The Civil Law of Juridical Acts
vi (1969).
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much more serious, problem was "relational," specifically, involved
the relationship between Article 395 and Article 1482. There was,
in fact, a clear and undeniable antinomy between the two Articles
insofar as the capacity of an interdict to donate inter vivos was
concerned: whereas the former provided that the interdict lacked
such capacity, period, end of story (in other words, this Article
created aper se incapacity with respect to donations inter vivos), the
latter provided that the interdict was merely presumed to lack such
capacity, a presumption that could possibly be rebutted (in other
words, this Article created only a presumption of incapacity with
respect to donations inter vivos). How this antinomy should have
been resolved was less than entirely clear. Perhaps the most
plausible way of resolving it would have been to invoke the
principle of "implied abrogation": when a new law is enacted that
"contains provisions that are contrary to, or irreconcilable with,
those of the former law," the former law is deemed to have been
superseded by the new law to the extent of the inconsistency. On
this theory, as between the contradictory rules for the capacity of
interdicts to donate inter vivos laid down in Articles 395 and 1482,
the former would have prevailed. But who could be certain?
The new law alters the old in two respects. First, it expands in
certain respects the per se incapacity to donate that results from
certain judgments of interdiction. Second, it alters the rules that
govern the proof of mental incapacity; in particular, it changes the
effects that certain judgments of interdiction have upon that proof.
In the process of effecting these changes, the new law clears away
many of the uncertainties that were created by "phase 2" of the
construction of the old law.
Under the new legislation, both a judgment of full interdiction
and a judgment of limited interdiction creates an incapacity to
donate (aper se incapacity). That resulting from full interdiction is
total, that is, it extends to both kinds of donations-inter vivos and
mortis causa - and to all of the interdict's property. That resulting
from limited interdiction is partial, and that in two respects: first, it
extends only to donations inter vivos (not to donations mortis
causa) and, second, it extends only to property that, by virtue of the
interdiction order, has been confided to the care of his curator (not
to property not addressed in the order).
Under the new legislation, ajudgment of limited interdiction, in
addition to creating a per se incapacity under the circumstances
described above, also alters the normal rules for proof of mental
incapacity to make donations in other circumstances. The normal
rules are these: (i) the person who challenges the donor's mental
capacity bears the burden of proof-in other words, mental capacity
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is presumed-and (ii) the standard of proof is clear and convincing
evidence. These rules are altered in two different situations.
The first is that in which the limited interdict attempts to make a
donation mortis causa of property that, by virtue of the interdiction
order, has been confided to the care of his curator. With respect to
this kind of donation of such property, the donor is presumed to lack
mental capacity-in other words, the person defending the donor's
capacity bears the burden of proof-and the standard of proof is
merely a preponderance of the evidence.
The second is that in which the limited interdict attempts to make
either a donation mortis causa or inter vivos of property that has not
been confided to the care of his curator. With respect to either kind
of donation of such property, the donor is still presumed to have
mental capacity-in other words, the person who challenges the
donor's mental capacity still bears the burden of proof, but the
standard of proof is now "lowered" from clear and convincing
evidence to a mere preponderance of the evidence.
With perhaps one exception, the new legislation is
unexceptionable as a matter of policy. The exception concerns the
rule that the legislation sets up for the capacity of a limited interdict
to make or revoke donations mortis causa of property that is under
the authority of his tutor. That rule, again, is that the interdict suffers
from no particular incapacity. There are at least two problems here.
First, the rule is inconsistent with the rule that the legislation sets up
for the capacity of a full interdict to make or revoke donations mortis
causa of property that is under the authority of his tutor. A full
interdict, it will be recalled, is per se incapable of making such
donations. Second, the rule still bears within it the anomalous
"curiosity" that plagued the original version of Article 1482. Why
one who has been determined to lack the ability to consistently make
"reasoned decisions" regarding certain property (a prerequisite to a
judgment of limited interdiction) should nevertheless be deemed
capable of donating that property mortis causa defies understanding.
Though the new legislation, with this one exception, is sound as
a matter of policy, it nevertheless exhibits a number of irksome
technical defects. Let us start with new Article 395. After stating
that "[a] limited interdict lacks capacity to make a juridical act
pertaining to the property or aspects of personal care that the
judgment of limited interdiction places under the authority of his
curator," the second sentence adds "except as provided in Article
1482 or in the judgment of limited interdiction." The language used
suggests that the proposition "a limited interdict lacks capacity to
make a juridical act pertaining to the property or aspects of personal
care that the judgment of limited interdiction places under the
authority of his curator" is a general rule, one that admits of
2004]
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exceptions, and that at least one such exception is to be found in
Article 1482. That other Article, however, far from setting out an
exception to the "general rule" of Article 395, sent. 2, merely
confirms it categorically: according to paragraph C of Article 1482,
"[a] limited interdict, with respect to property under the authority of
the curator, lacks capacity to make or revoke a donation inter vivos."
Thus, the phrase "except as provided in Article 1482," as used in
Article 395, is superfluous: it refers to nothing.
Now, let us look at new Article 1482. Here we encounter at least
three closely related, yet conceptually distinct, technical flaws.
First, the heading of the Article is now incommensurate with its
content. According to that heading, Article 1482 concerns "proof of
incapacity to donate." To some extent, specifically, to the extent that
the Article still contains "evidentiary" rules on assignment of the
burden of proof, standards of proof, and presumptions, the heading
remains accurate. In addition to those rules, however, the Article now
contains rules of a very different kind, specifically, "substantive"
rules that establish a new incapacity (as opposed to a mere
presumption of incapacity), namely, a per se incapacity due to
interdiction. To take account of these other rules, the heading should
have been changed accordingly.
Second, the Article is now thematically incoherent. The two sets
of rules it now contains differ not only in kind, but also in subject
matter. On the one hand, the evidentiary rules pertain to the
incapacity to donate due to "mental condition of the donor," which is
established by Article 1477. That is the particular "incapacity to
donate" the "proof' of which is governed by those rules. 12 On the
other hand, the substantive rules pertain to the newly-minted
incapacity to donate due to interdiction, an incapacity that, alongside
the incapacity to donate due to the mental condition of the donor
established by Article 1477 and the incapacity due to minority that is
established by Article 1476, forms a third distinct, independent and
free-standing incapacity.
Third, Article 1482 is not the proper place within the series of
Articles of which it is a part in which to set out the new substantive
rules. To the contrary, the new substantive rules belong among the
"earlier" Articles that recognize and enumerate the various
121. See Frederick William Swaim, Jr. & Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Successions
and Donations § 10.4, at 251, in 10 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1995) ("Revised
Article 1482 deals with the proof necessary to invalidate a donation due to mental
incapacity.") (emphasis added); see also Succession ofMiller, 803 So. 2d 1021 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 2001) (interpreting Article 1482 as a statement of rules of proof for
proving up mental incapacity under Article 1477); Succession of Chauffepied, 775
So. 2d 555 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2000) (same).
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incapacities rather than among the "later" Articles that concern proof
of those incapacities. The general plan underlying the original
arrangement of the chapter of which these Articles are a part (Chapter
2, Title 2, Book III of the Civil Code) is as follows:
I. Capacity in general, both to give and to receive (arts.
1470-1474)
A. General principle of capacity (art. 1470)
B. Time at which capacity vel non must be assessed (arts.
1471-1474)
1. Capacity to give (art. 1471)
2. Capacity to receive (art. 1472-1474)
a. General principle (art. 1472)
b. Exceptions (arts. 1473-1474)
1) Conditional donations (art. 1473)
2) Conditional donees: unborn children (art.
1474)
II. Specific capacities (arts. 1471-1483)
A. Capacity to receive (art. 1475)
1. Sanction for incapacity to receive: nullity (art.
1475)
B. Capacity to give (arts. 1476-1483)
1. Enumeration of incapacities, sometimes with
sanctions 2 (arts. 1476-1481)
a. Incapacities properly so called: enumeration
(arts. 1467-1477)
1) Incapacity due to minority (art. 1467)
2) Incapacity due to mental condition (art.
1467)
122. This part of the chapter (i.e., that which concerns the enumeration, etc. of
the various incapacities), as it was originally constructed, exhibits a disturbing lack
of "symmetry." Whereas there are provisions (actually, two Articles) that spell out
the sanction for a donation made by a donor whose consent is not free due to fraud,
duress, or undue influence (arts. 1480 and 1481), there is no corresponding Article
that spells out the sanction for a donation made by a donor who is incapable of
donating due to minority or mental condition. This omission becomes all the more
puzzling when one considers that there is also an Article, set out earlier in the
chapter, that spells out the sanction for a donation made to a donee who is incapable
of receiving (art. 1475). If the chapter is going to spell out the effects of incapacity
to receive and the effects of vitiated consent, should it not also spell out the effects
of incapacity to give? Of course it should.
It is the failure of the drafters of the "new" Articles on the law of successions and
donations (i.e., those revised after 1990) to attend to this and other technical niceties
(see the footnotes below) that has justly earned those Articles the unenviable label
"neo-barbarian." See A.N. Yiannopoulos, Requiem for a Civil Code: a
Commemorative Essay 19 & 21 (2002).
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b. Pseudo-incapacities (vices of consent)23 (arts.
1478-1481)
1) Enumeration
a) Fraud(art. 1478)
b) Duress (art. 1478)
c) Undue influence (art. 1479)
2) Sanctions
a) Effect on the donation (art. 1480)
b) Effect on the perpetrator (art. 1481)
2. Proof of incapacities
a. Proof of mental incapacity (art. 1482)
b. Proof of vices of consent (art. 1483)
Obviously enough, the proper place within this system for new
substantive rules that set up a new "true" incapacity to receive is not
II.B.2, but rather II.B. 1.a. 
24
B. Consent to Donate: Vices: "Undue Influence"
Between 1808 and 1990, the civil law of Louisiana ruled "out of
bounds" challenges to donations based on what, in common law
jurisdictions, has long been and still is known as "undue influence."
Article 1492 of the Civil Code of 1870, like Article 1479 of the Civil
Code of 1825 and Article 18 of Book III, Title II of the Digest of
1808 before it, prohibited the introduction of "[p]roof ... of the
dispositions having been made through . . . suggestion or
123. The inclusion of the Articles on "fraud," "duress," and "undue influence"
within this chapter represents another embarrassing technical gaff. This chapter, so
says its heading-"Chapter 2. Of the Capacity Necessary for Disposing and
Receiving by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa"--, is about "capacity." Now,
even a first-year student of the civil law knows that "fraud," "duress," and the like
pertain not to "capacity" but to "consent" (to be precise, to the "freedom" of
consent), which, in the law of juridical acts, is a prerequisite for validity that is
conceptually distinct from that ofcapacity. This fundamental distinction is reflected
throughout the Civil Code, most notably in Book III, Title IV which concerns the
law of contracts. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 1918 et seq. (which appear in a
chapter entitled "Chapter 2. Contractual Capacity and Exceptions") and arts. 1927
et seq. (which appear in a separate chapter entitled "Consent").
This technical defect could (and should) have been avoided in either oftwo ways.
First, the provisions on "fraud," "duress," and "undue influence" might have been
set off in a separate chapter. Second, the heading of chapter 2 could have been re-
worded to reflect the chapter's "consent"-related content (e.g., "Chapter 2. Of the
Capacity and Consent Necessary for Disposing and Receiving by Donation Inter
Vivos or Mortis Causa").
124. Those who would like to see what the legislation might have looked like
had its authors incorporated my technical suggestions should direct their attention
to Appendix A.
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captation.' ', 2' The rationale underlying this prohibition was eloquently
set forth in Succession of McDermott:
The authors of our Civil Code intended "to forever banish
from the courts a species of litigation which, except in very
rare instances, originates in disappointment, rancor, or
covetousness; which offers a strong temptation for perjury
and subornation of perjury; which feeds on scandal and
calumny; and which penetrates within the charnal house to
pour obloquy upon the ashes of the departed.'
126
In short, the point of the prohibition was to protect the memory of the
de cujus against selfishly-motived and perhaps even fabricated attacks
on his character and competence.
Though many today seem to be unaware of it, the introduction of
this prohibition into Louisiana law, which took place in 1808,
represented something of an innovation, one that set Louisiana apart
from most of the rest of the civil law world. 127 Under the law that
was in force in Louisiana during the first French colonial period,
28
nothing prohibited one from challenging a donation on the ground
that it was the product of "suggestion" or "captation.' ', 29 To the
125. The precise relationship between the civil law notions of "suggestion or
captation," on the one hand, and the common law notion of "undue influence," on
the other, has long been debated. See Laurie Dearman Clark, Comment,
Louisiana's New Law on Capacity to Make and Receive Donations: "Unduly
Influenced" by the Common Law?, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 183, 221-22 (1992); Katherine
Spaht et al., The New Forced Heirship Legislation.: A Regrettable "Revolution ",
50 La. L. Rev. 409, 469-70 (1990); Wood Brown III, Fraud, Undue Influence and
Captation in Wills-A Comparative Study, 34 Tul. L. Rev. 585, 591-92 (1960);
Edmond Nathaniel Cahn, Undue Influence and Captation: A Comparative Study,
8 Tul. L. Rev. 507 (1934). The position I've adopted here-that the two are, in
terms of their content, virtually indistinguishable-reflects what, in my estimation,
is the present consensus among Louisiana civil law scholars. See Clark, supra, at
222; Spaht et al., supra, at 470; Brown, supra, at 592.
126. 136 La. 80, 87-88, 66 So. 546, 548 (1914).
127. Challenges to donations based on "suggestion" or "captation" are (and have
long been) permitted in many civil lawjurisdictions. In some of these jurisdictions
(the majority), suggestion and captation are treated as a special species of fraud; in
others, as vices similar to, yet distinct from, fraud. Examples include France, Spain,
Italy, Argentina, and Brazil.
128. This law included, among other things, the Coutume de Paris and the
various ordinances of the French kings. J.-R. Trahan, The Continuing Influence of
Le Droit Civil and El Derecho Civil in the Private Law ofLouisiana, 63 La. L. Rev.
1019 (2003).
129. See Brown, supra note 126, at 591; see also 1 Baron Jean Grenier, Trait6
des Donations, des Testamens et de Toutes Autres Dispositions Gratuites no 143,
at 423 (4th ed. 1826) ("There was recognized in the ancient legislation an action
whereby testamentary dispositions could be annulled upon proof of facts of
captation or suggestion. The state of seduction or obsession in which one imagined
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contrary, such challenges were entirely permissible. The same seems
to have been true under the law of the Spanish colonial period. 13
Be that as it may, Louisiana's "experiment" with its novel
prohibition against challenges to donations based on suggestion and
captation or undue influence came to an end in 1991. In that year the
Louisiana Legislature, through Act No. 363 of the Regular Session,
enacted new Article 1479, which provided (and still provides) as
follows:
A donation inter vivos or mortis causa shall be declared null
upon proof that it is the product of undue influence by the
donee or another person that so impaired the volition of the
the testator excluded his liberty of mind . . . ."); 6 Philippe Antoine Merlin,
Suggestion § I, I, in Repertoire Universel et Raisonn6 de Jurisprudence 759 (5th ed.
1828) ("It is a certain principle, and one consecrated by Article 47 of the Ordinance
of 1735, that suggestion annuls those acts of liberality that are its handiwork.");
l'Ordonnance de 1735 art. 47 (adding, after what purported to be an exhaustive list
of the grounds for the nullity of donative instruments, "Without prejudice to other
means [of nullification] drawn from the suggestion or captation of the said acts.");
1 Jean-Marie Ricard, Trait6 des Donations Entre-Vifs et Testamentaires pt. III, ch.
1, nos 1 & 5, at 467-68 (1783) ("Despice concupiscentes hcereditatem tuam, &
dividentes jam inter se substantiam tuam, qui non te, sed patrimonium tuum
diligunt: Im6 qui cupiditate rerum tuarum te execrantur, non respicias adulationes
eorum, gladii suntjugalatores tui. Salvian. ad Eccles. Cath. Lib. 3. [Despise those
who, striving after your estate and already dividing among themselves your
substance, esteem not you but your patrimony: Nay, give no heed to the flattery of
those who are cursed by lust for your goods; they will cut your throat with a sword.]
It is not only out of favor for heirs and of concern to conserve successions for those
who are called to them by law that we must favorably hear false inscriptions and the
means of suggestion that are proposed against testaments: The public is likewise
interested in this, as much because every supposition contains in itself a species of
furtiveness and larceny, which always stimulates public vengeance, as because it is
a question of protecting the infirm against traps that are set up for them (gladii suntjugulatores tui); ... [the] public interest.., is always engaged in the protection of
the weak .... For these reasons, we do not doubt ... [that it is appropriate] to
receive proof of all sorts of facts, be they by criminal or civil procedures, when they
are of the quality of those that we have just expressed ..., as, in particular, falsity
and suggestion.... ")
130. In the so-called de la Verne Manuscript, an ancient copy of the Digest of
1808 that is widely believed to have belonged to Moreau-Lislet (the principal
drafter of the Digest), the annotation to Article 18 is "empty," that is, no sources are
cited. Id. at 212. Because Moreau-Lislet (or whoever else may have written the
Manuscript) diligently cited all of the Spanish and Roman law authorities he could
find that bore any resemblance to the rules set forth in the Digest, one can safely
infer that, in the case of the rule of Article 18, there were no such authorities. This
inference is confirmed by the research of Professor Batiza, who has identified the
final paragraph of Article IV, Book III, Title II of the Projet du gouvernement for
the French Code Civil as the true "source" of Article 18. See Rodolfo Batiza, The
Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources and Present Relevance, 46 Tul.
L. Rev. 4, 85 (1971) (App. C).
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donor as to substitute the volition of the donee or other person
for the volition of the donor.
Though the substance of this legislation was not altogether "new" to
Louisiana (inasmuch as French and Spanish law, as we have seen,
allowed attacks on donations based on suggestion or captation), its
form was a different matter. The legislators, instead of resurrecting
Louisiana's ancient civil law notions of "suggestion or captation" and
then modernizing them in the light of developments that have
occurred in other civil-law jurisdictions in the past two centuries,
simply imported the analogous common law notions of "undue
influence."
The legislature's decision in 1991 to "reverse course" with respect
to claims for suggestion and captation or undue influence, it bears
noting and remembering, was intimately connected with its decision
in that same year to change the law of forced heirship in various
respects, indeed, almost certainly would not have been made but for
that other decision. As Professor Katherine Spaht has recently
explained,
the legislative intent was "to afford some protection to
otherwise vulnerable descendants," who had previously been
protected from disinherison by the institution of forced
heirship. Thus, unlike common law jurisdictions where
undue influence had developed first to protect the testator's
autonomy and then to protect "family members," the
legislature envisioned undue influence as a narrowly targeted
protective device. Undue influence constituted the
legislature's protective response to the severe curtailment of
forced heirship, in other words principally for the sake of
otherwise unprotected descendants.3'
Thus, the return of suggestion and captation or undue influence was
designed as a "consolation prize" for those descendants who had "lost
out" under the revised law of forced heirship.
To date, the recognition of claims based on suggestion and
captation or undue influence has proved to be cold comfort for those
it was intended to protect. Since 1991, claims of undue influence have
been treated in nineteen appellate court opinions.132 In only two of
131. Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Remnant of Forced Heirship: The
Interrelationship of Undue Influence, What's Become of Disinherison, and the
Unfinished Business of the Stepparent Usufruct, 60 La. L. Rev. 637, 648 (2000)
(citations omitted) (emphasis original); see also Katherine Shaw Spaht, What We
Had and What We Lost, 43 Loy. L. Rev. 43, 48 (1997); Succession of Reeves, 704
So. 2d 252, 264 (Yelverton, J., dissenting).
132. See Appendix B.
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these did the claimant succeed, 33 that is to say, the failure rate for
such claims has been 89.5%.
Some critics of the new legislation (myself included), pointing to
the high failure rate of undue influence claims, 134 charge that the
institution has thus far "failed" to do its job, that is, to protect the
donor's descendants from successorial piracy. Though it is less than
entirely clear what is responsible for this failure, there would seem to
be at least two possibilities.
First, the standard of proof that undue influence claimants must
normally meet-"clear and convincing evidence"-may simply be
"too high."'135 This was, in fact, the applicable standard of proof in
ten of the fourteen cases in which such claims were rejected on the
merits. One can not help but wonder whether the results in at least a
few of these cases might not have been different had the applicable
standard of proof been that of "preponderance of the evidence," the
ordinary standard of proof in "civil" cases. 136
Second, it could be that the courts (or at least some of them) have
interpreted the new legislation too restrictively. The notorious case
of Succession ofReeves'" provides an illustration of this unfortunate
phenomenon. Not long after divorcing his first wife (who had born
him ten children), Reeves, an attorney, began dating and soon married
Jarrett, a much younger woman who was a friend of one of his
daughters. Nearly a decade later, after he was diagnosed with cancer,
Reeves made out a testament in which he left one-half of his estate to
133. See Appendix B. The two cases that feature successful undue influence
claims are Kraus v. Wheat, 856 So. 2d 45 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/3/03) and Succession
of Lounsberry, 824 So. 2d 409 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2002).
134. The failure rate is "high" not only in absolute terms, but also in comparative
terms. Between 1977 and 1999, American appellate courts decided 177 "undue
influence" cases. Of these, 66 were successful and 11, unsuccessful. Thus,
nationwide the failure rate for such claims is only 62.7%. Eunice L. Ross &
Thomas J. Reed, Will Contests § 7:14, at 7-85 (2d ed. 1999).
135. The rules governing the standards of proof applicable to claims of undue
influence, which are found in Article 1483, consist of(i) a general rule and (ii) an
exception. The general rule is that such claims must be proved by "clear and
convincing evidence." By way of exception, the claim need be proved only by a
"preponderance of the evidence" if (i) there is a "relationship of confidence"
between the alleged undue influencer and the donor and (ii) the alleged undue
influencer and the donor are not related to each other by affinity (i.e., marriage),
consanguinity (i.e., blood), or adoption. Thus, if the alleged undue influencer and
the donor are relatives of each other, then the applicable standard is "clear and
convincing evidence," even if there should exist between them a relationship of
confidence.
136. This problem was foreseen by many of the critics of the original law of
undue influence, among them Professor Spaht. See Spaht, What We Had, supra
note 132, at 48. Their warnings went-and still go-unheeded.
137. 704 So. 2d 252 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1997).
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Jarrett in full ownership and the other one-half to his children in
naked ownership, subject to a usufruct in Jarrett's favor. After
Reeves's death, which occurred three months later, the children
challenged the testament on the ground that it had been procured
through Jarrett's "undue influence." The principal form of this
influence, the children argued, was "sexual extortion." According to
the children's expert medical witness (a forensic psychiatrist), Reeves
had an "extreme need for love and sexual intercourse. . .[and] for
companionship" and deeply feared "being alone."' 8 Jarrett exploited
these weaknesses, the children contended, by threatening to abandon
him and, therewith, to deprive him of sexual intercourse if he did not
do as she asked. The trial court, finding this evidence persuasive,
voided the testament. On appeal, a highly divided appellate court (the
split was three to two) reversed that judgment. In the course of the
"opinion of the court," which managed to garner only two votes, 39
the author made a number of statements regarding the law of "undue
influence" that raised more than a few eyebrows in Louisiana's legal
community. Here are those statements, which, for convenience of
reference, I shall refer to as "Reeves rules 1, 2, and 3:"
(1) Reeves rule 1: "[W]hile we are unable to categorically
state that the charge of undue influence can never be leveled
against a surviving spouse who is the main beneficiary of a
testament by her spouse..., we do believe that a surviving
spouse is not the intended target of Article 1479 .... ,,140
(2) Reeves rule 2: The elements of the standard "common
law" test for assessing claims of undue influence -
"susceptibility," "opportunity," "disposition," and "coveted
result" - "are almost totally meaningless in determining
whether a person might have exerted undue influence" [i]n
a case such as the present.., where a spouse is the recipient
of the testator's bounty.' ' 4'
(3) Reeves rule 3: "What then would be the proper inquiry as
to undue influence on the part of a spouse? Several come to
mind: physical abuse, emotional abuse, fraud, deceit, or
criminal conduct ....
138. Id. at 258.
139. The author of the "opinion of the court," Judge Saunders, id. at 253, was
joined by only by Judge Woodward, id. at 261 (Woodward, J., concurring). Judge
Doucet simply "concur[red] in the result." Id. at 261 (Doucet, J., concurring).
Judges Amy and Yelverton dissented. Id. at 261 (Amy, J., dissenting) & at 264
(Yelverton, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 258.
141. Id. at 259.
142. Id. at 259.
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The upshot of all three rules is that, if claims of undue spousal
influence can be received at all, then they must meet certain
additional heightened requirements if they are to succeed. 43
Because the Reeves case has already been thoroughly and ably
criticized-with devastating effect, in my judgment-by my
colleague, Professor Katherine Spaht,' 44 there would be little point in
my now setting forth a full-blown critique of my own. There is,
however, at least one respect in which I might be able to supplement
the good professor's critique.
As I pointed out earlier, Louisiana derived its law of "undue
influence" from the "common law" tradition. It might, therefore, be
worth asking whether, within that tradition, there is any sort of
support to be found for the curious rules that were adopted by the
Reeves court, in other words, if there is any "historical basis" for
those rules.'45 My own survey of doctrinal writing on and
jurisprudential decisions involving "undue influence" in other
American states convinces me that the answer to this question is
"no."
Let us consider, first, the doctrine. The topic of "undue
influence" has been treated in scores of writings by American legal
scholars. The principal works (at least of the last century) include
treatises of wills by Page,146 Thompson,147 and Rollison' 48 ; Atkinson's
hornbook on wills'49; and the two Restatements on "donative
transfers."'5 ° Though not yet "classics" like the other treatises and
hornbooks, two recent works-one entitled "Will Contests," written
by Judge Ross and Professor Reed, the other, entitled "Wills, Trusts,
and Estates"- also merit special mention. 5' The authors of some of
143. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Remnant of Forced Heirship: The
Interrelationship of Undue Influence, What's Become of Disinherison, and the
Unfinished Business of the Stepparent Usufruct, 60 La. L. Rev. 637, 649 (2000).
144. Id. at 647-55.
145. To tell the truth, Professor Spaht explored this question, too. See Spaht,
Remnant, supra note 144, at 651-52. But the tack she took in answering it differs
a bit from my own.
146. 1 William J. Bowe & Douglas H. Parker, Page on the Law of Wills §§
15.1-15.13, at 711-43 (1960) (originally written by William Herbert Page).
147. George W. Thompson, The Law of Wills §§ 142-47, at 223-32 (3d ed.
1947).
148. William D. Rollison, The Law of Wills §§ 67-69, at 118-23 (1939).
149. Thomas E. Atkinson, Handbook of the Law of Wills § 55, at 255-62 (2d
ed. 1953).
150. Restatement (2nd) of Property: Donative Transfers § 34.7, at 302-11
(1990); Restatement (3rd) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 8.3,
at 143-64 (2001).
151. Eunice L. Ross & Thomas J. Reed, Will Contests §§ 7:1-21, at 7-1- 7-109
(2d ed. 1999); William M. McGovern, Wills, Trusts and Estates § 7.3, at 281-91
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these works do point out that claims of undue influence made against
surviving spouses are (relatively speaking) difficult to win,152 possibly
because courts allow "greater latitude... between husband and wife
with respect to persuasion or suggestion, because of the marital
relation."'53 But none of the authors even intimates, much less
expressly states, that spouses are not among the "intended targets" of
the law of undue influence (Reeves rule 1); that the standard test for
evaluating claims of undue influence, as applied to claims made
against surviving spouses, is "meaningless"(Reeves rule 2); or that a
claim of undue spousal influence, to be successfil, must be
predicated on proof of "physical abuse, emotional abuse, fraud,
deceit, or criminal conduct" (Reeves rule 3). To the contrary, all of
them note that a spouse can, indeed, be guilty of undue influence' 54
and, further, suggest that claims of undue spousal influence are
evaluated on the same basis as are other undue influence claims. As
Thompson notes,
where either spouse is charged with having overcome the
volition or free agency of the other, resort maybe had to proof
of circumstances to establish the charge, and if the evidence
shows that the testator disposed of his property differently
than he would have done if he had been left free to exercise
his own judgment, the will is invalid.'
Next, let us consider the jurisprudence. In the past several
decades, the appellate courts of the other American states decided
dozens of cases in which it was alleged that the testator's spouse
(usually a "second," "third," etc... spouse) had "unduly influenced"
the testator.156 Though the courts ultimately rejected the claims of
(2d ed. 2001).
152. Ross & Reed, supra note 152,§ 7:14, at 7-86, & § 7:15, at 7-86-7-87;
McGovern, supra note 152, § 7.3, at 286.
153. Thompson, supra note 148, § 144, at 228; see also Rollison, supra note
149, § 67, at 120 ("But if she [the wife] has specially exerted such influence to
procure a will of such kind as to be peculiarly acceptable to her, and to the
prejudice and disappointment of other who have claims to the testator's bounty, the
influence is undue.").
154. See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note ..... § 55, at 258 ("The influence of a
mistress is not necessarily undue, while that of a wife under certain circumstances
may be so regarded.").
155. Thompson, supra note 148, § 144, at 228.
156. See, e.g., Ruestman v. Ruestman, 111 S.W.3d 464 (Mo. App. 2003); Estate
of Lachmich, 541 N.W.2d 543 (Iowa App. 1995); Estate of Montgomery, 881
S.W.2d 750 (Tex. App. 1994); Estate of Pendleton, 1993 WL 97521 (Ark. App.
1993); Morse v. Volz, 808 S.W.2d 424 (Mo. App. 1991); Fields v. Mersack, 577
A.2d 376 (Md. App. 1990); McKee v. Stoddard, 780 P.2d 736 (Or. App. 1989);
Hodges v. Hodges, 692 S.W.2d 361 (Mo. App. 1985); Water's Estate, 629 P.2d
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undue influence in the vast majority of these cases, in none of them did
the court ever suggest that the "bar" which the claimant had to jump
over was somehow "higher" when the alleged "undue influencer" is the
testator's spouse. To the contrary, in each and every one of these cases,
the court applied to the claim of undue spousal influence the same
standards that courts of its jurisdiction apply to every claim of undue
influence, even those that involve "strangers."' 57 Not only that, but in
at least a few of these cases, the courts found that the testator's spouse
had "unduly influenced" the testator and, on that basis, struck down the
wills. 5 8 In not one of those cases, however, did those who challenged
the will even allege, much less produce evidence, that the testator's
spouse had engaged in "physical abuse, emotional abuse, fraud, deceit,
or criminal conduct.""' An apt summary of the American courts'
attitude toward claims of undue spousal influence can be found in this
quip from the Maryland Court of Appeals: "a wife's importuning of a
husband, while perhaps more understandable and less blameworthy
[than importuning by others], [i]s no less importuning and affected
whether the will expressed the decedent's will or that of his wife."'"
For these reasons, one can safely conclude that the history of the
institution of "undue influence" provides no warrant for drawing the
kind of distinction between spouses, on the one hand, and other
potential "undue influencers," on the other, that the Reeves court
recognized. Thus, not only is the Reeves rule inconsistent with the
texts and the purposes of the pertinent Civil Code Articles-that which
Professor Spaht has already convincingly demonstrated; it also is an
historical novelty, one wholly without "precedent."
470 (Wyo. 1981); Henderson v. Sims, 591 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Gill
v. Gill, 254 S.E.2d 122 (1979); Hall's Estate v. Milkovich, 492 P.2d 1388 (1972);
Hannah v. Hannah, 461 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1971); Stefike's Estate, 179 N.W.2d 846
(1970); Ritter's Estate, 168 N.W.2d 588 (1969); Kishfy v. Kishfy, 241 A.2d 827
(1968); Hughes v. Averza, 161 A.2d 671 (1960); Hammonds v. Hammonds, 297
S.W.2d 391 (1957); See v. See, 293 S.W.2d 225 (Ky. 1956); Lindinger v.
Lindinger, 130 N.E.2d 75 (1955); Street v. Street, 22 So. 2d 35 (1945); Teel's
Estate, 154 P.2d 384 (1944); Martin v. Martin, 166 N.E. 820 (Mass. 1929); Emery
v. Emery, 111 N.E. 287 (1916); see also Reddaway's Estate, 329 O.2d 886 (1958)
(the claim was that the testator's spouse, along with others, had unduly influenced
the testator to destroy his will).
157. This finding is inconsistent with Reeves rule 2.
158. Fields, 577 A.2d at 376; McKee, 780 P.2d at 736; Water's Estate, 629 P.2d
at 470; Street, 22 So. 2d at 35; Teel's Estate, 154 P.2d at 384; Martin, 166 N.E. at
820; Emery, 111 N.E. at 287; see also Reddaway's Estate, 329 P.2d at 886 (finding
testator's spouse guilty of having "unduly influenced" testator to destroy will).
It's worth noting that the mere fact that there's even one "undue influence"
decision in which the court found against a second spouse negatives Reeves rule 1.
159. This finding is inconsistent with Reeves rule 3.
160. Fields, 577 A.2d at 378.
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Despite the manifest and multiple deficiencies in Reeves, its
pernicious influence continues to be felt. That became clear late last year
when the Second Circuit announced its decision in Succession of
Cooper,16 ' another case of alleged (second) spousal "undue influence."
After the death of his first wife, the donor, Cooper, "began seeing" a
certain Juanita. Though Cooper's children (by his first wife) were
initially cool to the relationship, they eventually reconciled themselves
to it. Nearly two decades later, after Cooper suffered a debilitating
stroke, Juanita began to care for Cooper in his home. A month or so
later, Cooper and Juanita, without the knowledge of Cooper's children,
were married in Cooper's home by a justice of the peace. A few days
after that, Juanita showed up at Cooper's bank, marriage license in hand,
asking that her name be placed on all of Cooper's accounts. Bank
officials, after putting her offby telling her that she would need to obtain
a "power of attorney" from Cooper to make such changes, informed
Cooper's son Gary, a co-signatory on Cooper's accounts, of these
developments. Gary responded by setting up a new account in his name
and the name of his sister, Patsy, and then transferring into this account
the funds that had been in his joint accounts with Cooper. According to
the children, Juanita, upon learning of the funds transfer, told Cooper that
they had "stolen" his money. In addition, the children claimed, Juanita
told Cooper that they wanted to put him in a nursing home, further
poisoning his relationship with them. A few days later, Cooper made out
a testament (which his attorney had brought to him at his home) in which
he left everything to Juanita, save for $1 to each of his children. After
Cooper's death, the children challenged the testament, arguing that it was
the product of Juanita's "undue influence" over Cooper. The trial court,
relying on Reeves, turned back the challenge. The children appealed
from that judgment, arguing that the trial court had "erroneously
interpreted Reeves to stand for the proposition that a spouse cannot be
guilty ofundue influence."'62 The court of appeal affirmed the judgment.
In doing so, the court largely side-stepped the question of "what Reeves
means." After rejecting the contention that the trial court had interpreted
Reeves as the children had alleged (an allegation that, if the truth be told,
had more merit to it than the court of appeal let on), the court of appeal
made no further mention of that case. Instead, the court seems to have
evaluated the evidence on the basis of the texts of and comments to
Articles 1479 and 1483 themselves, without the benefit ofanyparticular
jurisprudential "gloss" on the Articles, whether derived from Reeves or
elsewhere. According to the court, that evidence, so evaluated, was
"circumstantial at best, if not mere assumption."
161. 820 So. 2d 1087 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2002).
162. Id. at 1092.
163. Id. at 1093.
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Though the Cooper court is to be applauded for its not having
repeated any of the errors of the Reeves opinion, it can nevertheless be
criticized for its having failed to avail itself of this ideal opportunity to
repudiate those errors. Until the courts of appeal openly denounce
Reeves, it will, like a kind ofjudicial Sirens' song, continue to lead trial
courts off course into error.
When the standard of proof falls to a "preponderance of the
evidence"' ' and when the court does not interpret Article 1479 in an
unduly restrictive manner, the claimant has at least a chance of success.
That this is so is proved by the recent case of Kraus v. Wheat.165 After
his wife of forty-three years died, the donor, Kraus, who had depended
on his wife for nearly everything (personal care included), was
devastated. Soon he was befriended by a neighbor, Wheat, who began
to help him around the house. In time, as Kraus's confidence in Wheat
grew, he began to seek her advice on a number of matters, including his
finances. On her advice, he hired her attorney to open his former wife's
succession. One month later, again on her advice, he "signed some
papers" at the office of her notary. These papers included an act of
donation whereby Kraus purported to donate to Wheat his interest in
his house and lot. What Wheat told Kraus about the papers prior to his
signing them was disputed. According to Kraus, Wheat told him that
the papers would simply facilitate her ability to care for him, as a result
of which Kraus, who did not read the papers, assumed they contained
some sort of "power of attorney."According to Wheat, Kraus knew full
well that the papers included an act of donation. In fact, Wheat
claimed, Kraus had told her that he wanted to give her his house and lot
so that his grandchildren would not get it. In any event, some months
later Kraus, claiming he had only then discovered that he had made an
act of donation to Wheat, filed suit against her to have the donation
nullified, arguing that he had been the victim of Wheat's "undue
influence." At the trial, Kraus's version of events was backed by the
testimony ofjust one witness, his son's girlfriend; that of Wheat, by her
attorney, her notary, and her daughter. After making appropriate
determinations of credibility and weighing the evidence, the trial court
concluded that Kraus had met his burden of proving undue influence
by a preponderance of the evidence and, on that basis, set the donation
aside. That determination was affirmed on appeal.
164. That happens when (i) there is a relationship of confidence between the
alleged undue influencer and the donor and (ii) they are not relatives of each other.
See supra note 135 (explicating La. Civ. Code art. 1483).
165. 856 So. 2d 45 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2003).
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APPENDIX A
Art. 1476. Minors; incapacity to make donations,
exceptions
A minor under the age of sixteen years does not have
capacity to make a donation either inter vivos or mortis
causa, except in favor of his spouse or children.
A minor who has attained the age of sixteen years has
capacity to make a donation, but only mortis causa. He may
make a donation inter vivos in favor of his spouse or
children.
Art. 1476.1. Interdicts; incapacity to donate
A. A full interdict lacks capacity to make or revoke a
donation inter vivos or disposition mortis causa.
B. A limited interdict, with respect to property under the
authority of the curator, lacks capacity to make or revoke a
donation inter vivos, except as provided in the judgment of
limited interdiction.
Art. 1477. Capacity to donate, mental condition of donor
To have capacity to make a donation inter vivos or mortis
causa, a person must also be able to comprehend generally the
nature and consequences of the disposition that he is making.
Art. 1478. Nullity of donation procured by fraud or
duress
A donation inter vivos or mortis causa shall be declared
null upon proof that it is the product of fraud or duress.
Art. 1481. Fiduciary appointment, termination
Any person who, whether alone or with others, commits
fraud or exercises duress or unduly influences a donor
within the meaning of the preceding Articles, or whose
appointment is procured by such means, shall not be
permitted to serve or continue to serve as an executor,
trustee, attorney or other fiduciary pursuant to a designation
as such in the act of donation or the testament or any
amendments or codicils thereto.
Art. 1482. Proof of incapacity to donate due to mental
condition
20041 395
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A. A person who challenges the mental capacity of a
donor must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
donor lacked that capacity at the time the donor made the
donation inter vivos or executed the testament.
B. A limited interdict, with respect to property under the
authority of the curator, is presumed to lack mental capacity
to make or revoke a disposition mortis causa. With respect to
his other property, the limited interdict is presumed to have
mental capacity to make or revoke a donation inter vivos or
disposition mortis causa. These presumptions may be
rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.
Art. 1483. Proof of fraud, duress, or undue influence
A person who challenges a donation because of fraud,
duress, or undue influence, must prove it by clear and
convincing evidence. However, if, at the time the donation
was made or the testament executed, a relationship of
confidence existed between the donor and the wrongdoer and
the wrongdoer was not then related to the donor by affinity,
consanguinity or adoption, the person who challenges the
donation need only prove the fraud, duress, or undue
influence by a preponderance of the evidence.
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APPENDIX B
Appellate Opinions Treating of Claims of Undue Influence
(arranged in reverse chronological order)
19
Kraus v.
Wheat, 856
So.2d 45,
2003-0393
(La.App. 4
C i r.
9/3/03),
La.App. 4
Cir., Sep
03, 2003
18
Succession
of Gilbert,
850 So.2d733,
37,047
(La.App. 2C i r .
6/5/03),
La.App. 2
Cir., Jun
05, 2003
17
Haynes v.
Haynes,
848 So.2d
3 5
2002-0535
(La.App. 1
C i r .
5/9/03),
La.App. 1
Cir., May
09, 2003
Neighbor
(non-
relative)
Caretaker
(non-
relative)
Son
Prepon-
derance
Prepon-
derance
Clear &
convincing(?)
Successful
I Failed
Failed
Sufficient
evidence
Insuffi-
ci ent
evidence
Lack of
standing
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16
Succession
of Tanner,
836 So.2d
1280,
2002-1570
(La.App. 4
C i r.
2/5/03),
La.App. 4
Cir., Feb
05, 2003
15
Succession
of Cooper,
830 So.2d
1087,
36,490
(La.App. 2
Cir.
10/23/02),
La.App. 2
Cir., Oct
23, 2002
14
Succession
of Linder,
824 So.2d
52 3
02- 106
(La.App. 5Cir.
7/30/02),
La.App. 5
Cir., Jul
30, 2002
13
Succession
o f
Lounsberr
y, 824
So.2d 409,
Attorney
(non-
relative)
Wife
CPA (non-
relative)
Son
Prepon-
derance
Clear &
convincing
Prepon-
derance
Clear &
convincing
Failed
Failed
Failed
Successful
Insuffi-
ci ent
evidence
Insuffi-
ci ent
evidence
Insuffi-
ci ent
evidence
Sufficient
evidence
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2001-1664
(La.App. 3
C i r.
5/8/02),
La.App. 3
Cir., May
08, 2002
12
Succession
of Miller,
803 So.2d
1021,
35,244
(La.App. 2
C i r.
12/7/01),
La.App. 2
Cir., Dec
07, 2001
11
Succession
of Poland,
784 So.2d
701,
34,291
(La.App. 2
Cir.
4/4/01),
La.App. 2
Cir., Apr
04, 2001
10
Succession
o f
Burguieres,
802 So.2d
660
00-147
(La.App. 5
C i r.
10/18/00),
La.App. 5
Grandson
Son
Sister
Clear &
convincing
Clear &
convincing
Clear &
convincing(?)
Failed
Failed
Failed
Insuffi-
ci ent
evidence
Untimely
Preter-
m i tted
(donor
lacked
capacity)
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Cir., Oct
18, 2000
9
Cupples v.
Pruitt, 754
So.2d 328,
32,786
(La.App. 2
C i r.
3/1/00),
La.App. 2
Cir., Mar
01, 2000
8
Succession
of Gates,
746 So.2d
193,
32,348
(La.App. 2
C i r.
10/27/99),
La.App. 2
Cir., Oct
27, 1999
7
Succession
o f
Deshotels,
735 So.2d
826,
1998-1467
(La.App. 3
C i r.
5/12/99),
La.App. 3
Cir., May
12, 1999
6
Succession
of Reeves,
Caretaker
& first
cousin
once-
removed
in-law
Grand-
niece
Daughter
Clear &
convincing
Clear &
convincing
Clear &
convincing
S econdI Clear
Failed
Failed
Failed
Failed
Insuffi-
ci ent
evidence
Insuffi-
ci ent
evidence
Insuffi-
cient
evidence
Insuffi-
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704 So.2d
252, 97-20
(La.App. 3
C i r.
10/29/97),
La.App. 3
Cir., Oct
29, 1997
5
Succession
of Jurisich,
694 So.2d
928
94-1262
(La.App. 4
C i r.
4/25/96),
La.App. 4
Cir., Apr
25, 1996
4
Succession
o f
Anderson,
656 So.2d
42, 26,947
(La.App. 2
C i r.
5/10/95),
La.App. 2
Cir., May
10, 1995
3
Succession
of Braud,
646 So.2d
1168,
94-0668
(La.App. 4
C i r.
11/17/94),
La.App. 4
wife
Second
wife
Niece
Caretaker
(non-
relative)
convincing
Clear &
convincing(.?)
Clear &
convincing
Prepon-
derance
ci e nt
evidence
Preter-
mitted
Insuffi-
ci ent
evidence
Insuffi-
cient
evidence
Failed
Failed
Failed
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Cir., Nov
17, 1994
2
Succession
of Duboin,
649 So.2d
6 1 7,
94-446
(La.App. 3
C i r.
11/2/94),
La.App. 3
Cir., Nov
02, 1994
1
Succession
of Cole,
618 So.2d
5 5 4,
La.App. 4
Cir., Apr
28, 1993
Adopted
step -
daughter
Caretaker
& sister-in-
law
Clear &
convincing
Clear &
convincing
Succeeded
(per
concurring
judge)
Failed
Sufficient
evidence
(per
concurring
judge)
Insuffi-
ci ent
evidence
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